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Abstract: This Article has a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it offers comparative materials for an informed discussion of COVID-determined emergency law in
China and Italy by assessing its normative implications and political genealogy.
On the other hand, it explores the essential contiguity between the ‘state of
exception’ triggered by the pandemic and the possible geopolitical shifts in global
legal hegemony in the actual phase of surveillance capitalism which is witnessing
a decline of law as a form of social organization and its replacement by the predictive models elaborated by technology. In this respect, the traditional Western
iconography has long described the Chinese legal tradition as a “law without law”,
a despotic regime with intrusive population surveillance whose distance from the
Western paradigm is deemed almost unbridgeable. And yet the legal response to
coronavirus both in Europe and in the U.S. somewhat replicates the allegedly
distant Chinese model in terms of restrictions and surveillance mechanisms which
are being deployed to counter the crisis in the face of a formal commitment to the
rule of law. This Article concludes that the emerging pre-eminence of the “rule of
technology” over the “rule of law” in a critical event of historic proportions like a
pandemic should and will set the future agenda of comparative studies in a double
direction. On the one hand it calls for a truly critical reconsideration of role of law
in society which in turn impels to rethink the hold of the liberal constitutional
model and the obsolescence of traditional legal taxonomies. On the other hand, it
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might point to the emergence of an unexpected Chinese legal leadership, determined by the progressive undoing of the Western legal and political narratives
whose backbone has been relentlessly eroded by decades of neoliberalism and
populism.
Keywords: comparative law, coronavirus, state of exception, global hegemony,
legal taxonomies.

1 The State of Exception and the New Legal Order
This paper has a double purpose. On the one hand, it offers comparative materials
for an informed discussion of COVID-determined emergency law in China and
Italy. On the other hand, it predicts a change of hegemony in global legal leadership, where China, unimpaired by the Western capitalist rhetoric of the rule of
law whose democratic decay is manifest in the rise of authoritarian legalism and
political populism, will set the standards of a global technological law, beyond
traditional western narratives of freedom and dignity,1 with sociopolitical and
legal implications that should be looked through a critical lens.
It thus seems a proper moment to apply some tools of critical comparison to
the unfolding global saga determined by the spread of COVID-19 across the world.2
The declaration of the “pandemic” nature of this epidemic by a UN scientiﬁc
organism such as the World Health Organization (whose integrity and insulation
from corporate inﬂuence has been questioned in the past)3 can be read as the
proclamation of a global “state of exception”, that has been followed by speciﬁc
legal interventions by all but every country in the world.4 Thus, if the famous
notion propounded by German Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, according to which the
sovereign is the one who can proclaim the “state of exception” is correct,5 we can
now say that this crisis is for the ﬁrst time showing at play a global sovereign whose
authority, rather than political, is indeed “scientiﬁc”.
Almost two decades ago, the senior Author of this Article, in a paper devoted to
the HIV contaminated crisis due to blood transfusions, introduced the tools of
1 See Burrhus F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971).
2 See Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law 805 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2nd ed., 2019).
3 Leo W. J. C. Huberts, Integrity: What it is and Why it is Important, Public Integrity 1 (2018).
4 See https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-themedia-brieﬁng-on-covid-19—11-march-2020.
5 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [2nd rev. ed.,
1934] (George Schwab transl., 2005). On the notion of “state of exception”, see also Giorgio
Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attell transl., 2005).

Advantage in Emergency Law

3

distress-based path dependency for the critical understanding of comparative
legal change.6 In 2007, globally acclaimed journalist and activist Naomi Klein,
introduced the notion of “Shock doctrine” pointing at the capacity of capitalism to
turn disasters in its own beneﬁt.7 Later on, the concept of “emergency-based
predatory capitalism”8 was deployed to discuss the use of “rule of law” narrative as
denial of the political nature of humanitarian intervention. The dark side of human
rights9 has been unveiled as the engine of ongoing Western efforts of “plunder”.10
Today a new interesting tool of critical discussion, “surveillance capitalism”, has
been introduced, which points at the 2001 attack to the twin towers in New York
City as an emergency-based turning point in current capitalist developments.11
Deploying these tools, this paper explores the metamorphosis occurring in the
comparative image and role of Chinese law that is taking place because of the
global pandemic and entrance in the age of surveillance capitalism. The thirty-year
long dismissal of China as “lacking the rule of law” might be finally over, not so
much because China moved genuine steps in that direction, but because the West
dismissed any attempt to be faithful to its own narrative.12 The decline of credibility
of Western legality after 9/11 is no marginal factor in the historical change of
hegemony that the epidemic might have triggered. Of course, as every form of
hegemony,13 also the one of Western lawyers in China was possible only because
(most of) the Chinese legal profession has internalized the idea of its own “lack”14,
facilitating the reproduction of “legal orientalism” in comparative law.15 As
6 See Ugo Mattei, Legal Systems in Distress. HIV Contaminated Blood Path Dependency and Legal
Change, Global Jurist 1 (2001).
7 See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007).
8 See Ugo Mattei, Emergency-Based Predatory Capitalism. The Rule of Law, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Development, in Contemporary States of Exception: The Politics of Military and
Humanitarian Interventions 89ff. (Didier Fassin & Mariella Pandolﬁ eds., 2010).
9 See David Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism
(2004); Id., The International Human Rights Movement: Still Part of the Problem?, in Examining
Critical Perspective on Human Rights 19 (Rob Dickinson, Elena Katselli, Colin Murray & Ole W.
Pedersen, eds., 2012).
10 Ugo Mattei & Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal (2008). See also Mauro
Bussani, Deglobalizing Rule of Law and Democracy: Hunting Down Rhetoric Through Comparative
Law, 67 Am. J. Comp. L. 701 (2019).
11 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New
Frontier of Power (2019). See infra Section 3.2.
12 See e. g., Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Toward the Rule of Law (2002).
13 See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and Latin Resistance, 10
Ind. J. Glob. Legal Stud. 383 (2003).
14 See Jedediah J. Kroncke, The Futility of Law and Development. China and the Dangers of
Exporting American Law (2016).
15 See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism. China, the United States, and Modern Law (2013).
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scholars, we have no stake nor agency, of course, to reverse hegemony in law. We
only have a duty to recover some less ideologically tainted approaches in
comparing the self-perceived Western democracy with the self-perceived Chinese
socialist model. Double standards are the foe of sound comparative work.16
More than 20 years ago the senior of these authors recommended to deploy a
comparative law taxonomy free from ethnocentrism and Western biases. Three
Patterns of Law argued the necessity of respecting the options of every world legal
system in the always contested and adjusting balance of power between legal
professionalism, political decision-making and traditional production of law.17
Today, in the global collapse of Western democracy under corporate takeover, the
undeniable rise of prestige of the Chinese model (also in comparative studies)18
suggests to approach the ﬁrst genuinely global “state of exception” with that
framework in mind. Every legal system, understood as formalized power, deploys
professionalism, politics and tradition as controlling processes19 to maintain status quo and social order. Technological changes might shift the balance of power
among such processes or even entirely substitute any one of them. In conditions of
distress, new tendencies emerge more openly, invariably defeating dominant selfnarratives.20
In this dramatic phase of legal change, it is especially interesting to look
comparatively to China and Italy. The latter is a traditionally semi-peripheral
country,21 with only nominal political sovereignty, being part of the NATO alliance and of the Euro area. It is, however, a country of long and prestigious legal
tradition, with a style that has been studied by comparatists as “in between”
French and German models – thus a good proxy of the European legal tradition.22

16 See Elisabetta Grande, Hegemonic Human Rights and African Resistance: Female Circumcision
in a Broader Comparative Perspective, 4 Global Jurist Frontiers 1 (2004).
17 Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal System, 45 Am. J.
Comp. L. 5 (1997).
18 See recently Taisu Zhang, Development of Comparative Law in Modern China, in The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Law 228 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2nd ed.,
2019).
19 In the sense developed by Laura Nader in more than 50 years of digging in this direction. See,
most relevant, Laura Nader, Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry into Boundaries, Power, and
Knowledge (1996).
20 See infra Sections 2, and 3.2 and 3.3.
21 On the notion of semi-periphery, the classic reading is Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist
World-Economy (1979).
22 See, e. g., John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition. An
Introduction to the Legal System of Europe and Latin America (3rd ed., 2007).
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During the long season of neoliberalism, which included the dismantling of the
Soviet Union, Western mainstream,23 oblivious of the astonishing performances
of the Communist Party of China, has developed a US-dominated paradigm of the
“End of History”.24 Italy joined the chorus and has ever since imported (quite
uncritically) massive amounts of common-law style solutions in its legal system.25 As a civil law country early experimenting with common law imports, Italy
has managed to maintain some of its traditional prestige especially in the Iberian
Peninsula and in Latin America. Moreover, through its established school of
Roman law scholars, it has maintained some degree of global scholarly relevance
– in China as well.
At the peak of the pandemic in Italy, air carried supplies of medicines and
other technologies arrived as courtesy of the Chinese Government in a phase in
which Chinese economic interests are quite present in Italy, where a large and
thriving Chinese community is growing in economic importance. A comparison
between Italian and Chinese emergency solutions offers some interesting insights
on the reasons of a possible change of global hegemony.26
We strongly believe that changes that are reached in emergency conditions are
there to stay. China over the centuries has shown exceptional resilience and capacity to smoothly digest foreign inputs, giving them a special Chinese traditional
blend. What in its long history has happened in the reception from the West of law
and political ideology, more recently has occurred in the realm of technology. The
outcome of these receptions, that the Chinese tradition has made a seamless
whole, might well be a global model of surveillance society for the XXI Century,
where predictability is granted trough technology rather than law. Not only does
this process manifest a decline of law as a form of social organization, but it points
out significant legal and sociopolitical transformations. After the crisis, like semi
peripheral Italy today, core Western countries will continue to converge in a direction of very little space for individual rights and idiosyncratic preferences,
showing that the wind now blows from East to West.
In an age of uncritical fideism in technology and dehumanization of human
activities, the technologization of society and legal culture ought to receive a close
critical scrutiny.

23 See Ugo Mattei, The Cold War and Comparative Law: A Reﬂection on the Politics of Intellectual
Discipline, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 567 (2017).
24 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).
25 See e. g., Elisabetta Grande, Imitazione e Diritto: Ipotesi sulla Circolazione dei Modelli (2000).
26 See Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 Am. J. Comp.
L. 195 (1994).
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2 Anatomy of an Emergency: The Chinese and
Italian Normative Responses to COVID-19
2.1 China’s Normative Response in Distress
China’s normative response to the sudden COVID-19 outbreak revolves around the
idea of a rule of law “with Chinese characteristics”. This is the gist of the legal
measures adopted to handle the pandemic, and must be read within the wider
theoretical framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics.27
Chinese society makes full use of the “Tai Chi/Ying Yang” dynamic thinking,
according to which the political, legal and social dimensions are closely and
inextricably intertwined.28 In other words, China cannot be grouped as a country
belonging to the “rule of professional law”,29 whereby law is conceived as disentangled and independent from tradition and from the political sphere. There is
not a clear division of public powers in a sort of God v. Caesar dynamic like the one
inspiring Western constitutionalism after the separation of Church and State. Nor
is there any neat conceptual separation between the State and civil society, like the
one famously masterminded by Hegel which is now part of the classic Western
social and political thought.30 However, this does not mean that China lacks the
rule of law, being this an mono-dimensional and ethnocentric way of looking at the
Chinese legal experience (and at the very idea of the rule of law). Rather, the
Chinese legal system has elaborated its own conception of the rule of law, which
simply differs from its Western counterpart.
Specifically, the Chinese notion of the rule of law (fa-zhi), as mentioned in the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [hereinafter PRCC],31 is based on the
circular interdependence between China’s socialist experience, its millenarian
history, and the sagehood of its culture, which are all elements that cannot be
deemed separate from – or hierarchically subordinated to – its legal tradition.
27 “Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC”
(Adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China on October 23, 2014).
28 Ku Hung-ming, The Spirit of the Chinese People 9–64 (1998).
29 Mattei, supra note 17.
30 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821] (Allen W. Wood ed.,
1991).
31 PRCC Const. Art 5(1) reads: “The People’s Republic of China shall practice law-based
governance and build a socialist state under the rule of law”. An ofﬁcial English version of the
Chinese Constitution can be found on the website of the National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China at https://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/201911/
1f65146fb6104dd3a2793875d19b5b29.shtml.
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Contrariwise, they all participate in forming a unitary system. Therefore, a foreign
observer trying to understand the functioning of Chinese legal order as it appears
today would have to deal with many different layers which are not totally
discernible from one another.
Brutally simplifying, we could say that a first layer is the never-lasting dialectic
between a set of socially recognized values and moral examples providing guidance for good behavior in daily life (the so-called li) on the one hand, and the
formal positive rules (the so-called fa) more akin – but not identical – to the
Western idea of law on the other hand. The binding force of moral values that
belong to the “rule of traditional law” cannot be underestimated. It is entrenched in
the Confucian tradition and it inevitably conditions the actual idea of the rule of
law. It originates from China’s 5000-year-long human civilization and its core
principles such as the primacy of the collective interest over the individual one, or
the principle of good governance.32
A second layer is the political element, since China’s modernization is being
pursued: a) under the leadership of the Communist Party of China [hereinafter CPC]
which is the political body called upon to foster social, economic and cultural
development, and realize the interest of the majority of Chinese People; and b)
under the ideological guidance of socialism adapted by and for Chinese society.
China is, indeed, a “socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship”, and it is “prohibited for any organization or individual to damage the socialist system”33 – for only by following the road of socialism will it be possible to
carry out reforms and to “promote coordinated material, political, cultural-ethical,
social and ecological advancement, in order to build China into a great modern
socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced,
harmonious and beautiful, and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation”.34
A third layer is linked to China’s opening up to the outside world through
reforms and receptions of professional legal ideas and models.35 As is well known,
China started to deeply reform its legal system under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping in late 1970s, and has never stopped its legal reconstruction ever since.
For instance, China became a member of the WTO in 2001,36 and introduced
32 See Ugo Mattei, Teemu Ruskola & Antonio Gidi, Schlesinger’s Comparative Law 282ff. (7th ed.,
2009) [hereinafter Schlesinger’s Comparative Law].
33 See PRCC Const. Art. 1(1) and (2).
34 These words are contained para. 7 of the Preamble to PRCC Const.
35 The initial idea and practice of introducing Western rule of law to achieve national prosperity
and strength can be traced back to China’s defeat in the Opium War and the invasion of the eightpower allied forces in the 1840s.
36 Schlesinger’s Comparative Law, at 31 ff.
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constitutional provisions protecting human rights (Art. 33(3) PRCC) and fostering
the private (non-public) sector, which is now raised to an important component of
the economy (Art. 11 PRCC). The previous planned economy was replaced by a
more market-oriented system – the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics – which is an economic model grounded in the socialist system under
the oversight of the State but open to the global market. This new order, especially
in the last few years under the impulse of ‘Xi Jinping’s thought on socialism with
Chinese characteristics for the New Era’, has turned China into one of the leading
world economies.
For sure, Chinese modernization was influenced by international models, but
it is by no means the result of a mere transplant. Rather, reforms combined the road
of socialism with the adaptation of foreign ideas to Chinese characteristics. The
dynamic relationship between, tradition, political leadership and professionalism
has generated a mature rule of law with Chinese characteristics, under the leadership of the CPC.37
In the light of the foregoing premises, we can summarize the experience and
the lessons from China’s legal response to COVID-19 as follows:
2.1.1 The Rule of Emergency Law: Institutional Advantages and Rule of Law with
Chinese Characteristics
The downside of Chinese government organization may be seen in its
bureaucratism which can lead to formalistic responses, intrusive agent control,
inefficiencies, and even failure of local governance. When unfortunately fell
into the eye of the storm, in the very early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, the
Chinese scientific and normative response to the soon-to-become epidemic was
not as prompt and effective as expected. From November to December 2019,
coronavirus was medically treated as a common flu or pneumonia just like
everywhere else. However, after the Chinese medical science community
realized that COVID-19 had similar coronavirus features to SARS with stronger
“human-to-human” epidemiological contagion, the Chinese government
rapidly made full use of its distinct institutional mechanisms and adopted
policies and practices grounded in its “rule of emergency law”. This is a body
of rules and practices developed on the basis of necessity, whose application is
temporary, tailored to the circumstances, and whose main content is

37 From the perspective of law and anthropology, “rule of professional law” can only be translated as “rule of Fa” in Chinese context.
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preventive. In the last decade, China’s emergency law, enshrined for instance
in the “Master State Plan for Rapid Response to Public Emergencies”(2006) and
in the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Response to Emergencies”(2007), is gradually becoming an integrate part of the rule of law with
Chinese characteristics as a reactive response to the different emergencies
China had to manage including the flood in the Yangtze river basin, the SARS
crisis, the political violence in Xinjiang region, and finally the present COVID19 outbreak.38
As to our specific topic, dating from January 25, 2020, which is the first day of
the Chinese lunar New Year of the Mouse, China’s top leader, Secretary General
and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC, President Xi Jinping,
personally presided over the Communist Party of China and the Central People’s
Government to coordinate and supervise an ad-hoc task force dedicated to COVID19 prevention and control. This central working group is led by the Prime Minister
Li Keqiang and other senior officials at central government whose expertise and
duty is closely related to disease prevention and control. Through this centralized
working group, China has implemented a systematic and scientific plan for the
containment of the virus that has proved itself effective in stifling the pandemic
throughout China. Despite some initial critiques, the Chinese solution has been
considered an efficient exportable model to be adopted in other countries which
are struggling to keep up with the spreading of COVID-19.39
2.1.2 Delving into the Chinese Scientific Response to COVID-19: Central
Coordination, Local Knowledge and Territorial Responsibility
The functioning of the Chinese solution to COVID-19 lies in the peculiar synchronic
coordination between central government and local authorities which recalls a
geometric game of chess whereby every move is studied in advance and arranged
in the light of the following.
As a first step, China’s most important policymaker, the CPC central committee, sent work teams to the Wuhan city and other epicenters in Hubei province
to push local authorities to comprehensively strengthen the front-line work of
prevention and control. It is worth noting that the Chinese institutional architecture is organized in the form of a multi-level apparatus with a division of functions

38 Meng Tao, Emergency Laws in China: Their Formation, Present Situation and Future, 124–40 and
222–23 Social Sciences in China (2011).
39 China’s Fight against COVID-19, http://www.chinanews.com/shipin/2020ggkf/2020/0330/
131.shtml (last visited May 4, 2020).
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between central and local state institutions at all levels (Art. 2 PRCC).40 This
institutional model follows the principle known as “democratic centralism”, which
entails that a) the government at the higher level is called up to supervise the one
below; b) the elected deputies at all levels are made responsible to people through
periodic election and are subject to their oversight; and c) all administrative,
supervisory, judicial and procuratorial organs of the state are created by the
people’s congresses and are, consequently, supervised by them (Art. 3 PRCC).
Hence, under the supervision of the central government, the foregoing institutional setting made possible to realize a prompt reorganization (appointment and
removal) of the top local authorities in both Hubei province and Wuhan city, as
well as to provide those areas with urgently needed medical forces and supplies in
order to meet daily necessities of the huge local population (nearly 60 million in
Hubei and 10 million in Wuhan). At the same time, however, Hubei province and
the city of Wuhan were required to carry out their own responsibilities at every
level; therefore, they were asked to speed up the construction of centralized hospitals, perform timely diagnoses and medical treatments, and strengthen the
rotation and protection of medical staff. Moreover, in the name of mutual help and
reciprocity, 29 out of China’s 34 provincial governments, with the exception of
Hubei, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, including Xinjiang Construction
Corps and Military Units, sent more than 42,000 medical and nursing units to assist
Wuhan and other areas of Hubei province. In other key epidemic areas in Hubei
province outside Wuhan city, a “one-to-one contract method” was adopted to carry
out medical assistance and treatment support.41
PRC Central Government also intervened with timely legislative decisions
based on medical science evidence and in accordance with the rule of emergency
law. For instance, following the researches carried out by the national and international medical science community which established the possible animal origin
of the virus, special legislation was enacted. In particular, on February 24, 2020,
the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislature, voted to enact the Decision on Banning the Illegal Wildlife Trade, Abolishing
the Bad Habit of Excessive Eating of Wild Animals, and Effectively Protecting People’s Lives, Health and Safety to prevent the cross-infection between human and
wild animals and the spread of the disease. This piece of legislation prohibits and
40 PRCC Const. Art. 2 reads: “All power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people.
The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People’s Congress and
the local people’s congresses at all levels. The people shall, in accordance with the provisions of
law, manage state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings, and social affairs through various
channels and in various ways”.
41 China’s Fight against COVID-19, https://www.chinanews.com/shipin/2020ggkf/2020/0330/
131.shtml (last visited May 4, 2020).
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punishes – even resorting to criminal sanctions – hunting, trading, transportation
and consumption of “land wildlife of important ecological, scientiﬁc and social
value” and other land wildlife under state protection, including those that are
artiﬁcially bred or reared in captivity. Furthermore, to contrast the spread of the
pandemic, Chinese Government has also adopted policies and rules aimed at
systematically standardizing law enforcement so as to urge all members of the
society to behave strictly in accordance with the law and cooperate with the institutions in halting the virus.42 Just to name few key points, since the very
beginning of the epidemic, the State Administration for Market Regulation of China
has implemented a centralized government take-over and allocation system for the
production, operation, and distribution of medical equipment and resources. As to
the individual measures, China has often resorted to criminal law to enforce public
health measures. To this end, China’s Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice
issued a joint document concerning criminal sanctions and provisions enforced to
punish violations of emergency rules. Notably, Chinese citizens (but the provision
was extended to foreigners and stateless people in later period) who have concealed travel information in epidemiologically risky areas, especially health information related to COVID-19 symptoms, and have thus contributed to the spread
of the epidemic are subject to investigation and, if found guilty, are held liable of a
punishable crime. Moreover, any attempt to conceal the infection in public places
and any failure on the part of individuals with suspected or conﬁrmed coronavirus
disease to comply with mandatory quarantine and isolation rules will be deemed
willful conduct directed to spread the virus and, therefore, severely punished
according to criminal law.43 Finally, the emergency-based legislation and rules
have also witnessed the hardening of sanctions and punishments for other criminal conducts carried out to take unfair advantage of the epidemiological crisis
(e. g., fraud, corruption, embezzlement, sabotage, counterfeit medicines trafﬁcking, misinformation, etc.).
As far as the local level is concerned, all governments in China are required to
set up strategic teams led by the local party and political leaders, in cooperation
with the central government, whose main aim is to rapidly and efficiently respond
42 The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Banning the
Illegal Wildlife Trade, Abolishing the Bad Habit of Excessive Eating of Wild Animals, and Effectively Protecting People’s Lives, Health and Safety(Adopted at the 16th meeting of the Standing
Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on February 24, 2020) https://www.npc.gov.cn/
npc/c30834/202002/c56b129850aa42acb584cf01ebb68ea4.shtmlhttp://www.chinanews.com/
shipin/2020ggkf/2020/0330/131.shtml (last visited May 4, 2020).
43 Opinions on Punishing Crimes of Breaching the Prevention and Control of COVID-19 According to
Law (March 3, 2020).
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to COVID-19 by implementing drastic emergency measures based on scientific
evidence and designed to maximize patients’ care and minimize mortality.44
Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of the epidemic outbreak, these teams
were demanded to carry out epidemic surveillance, centralize medical treatment of
patients found positive to the virus, and impose compulsory isolation with active
surveillance on those who were suspected to have had contacts with infected
people.
As to the specific measures adopted locally, dating from early morning of
January 23, the Prevention and Control Headquarters in the city of Wuhan formally
communicated to the citizens that: a) all bus, ferry, subway, airport, railways and
long-distance transport services in general were suspended; b) citizens were
prohibited to leave Wuhan without special reasons; c) all asymptomatic rural and
urban residents were isolated from home in their communities. Subsequently, the
other 12 municipalities in the Hubei province announced the closure of cities one
after another. Concomitantly, almost everywhere outside Hubei province, some
graduated form of emergency quarantine policies was implemented and commercial and outdoor activities in public places were strictly closed. Based on the
ideals of individual responsibility and social mutuality, basic necessities for ordinary life were supplied for more than two months by the staffs of the corresponding local community through the highly developed digital commerce
platforms of China, and with the assistance and support of volunteers.45
In order to pursue its ambitious plan for the containment of the virus, Chinese
government quickly mobilized a huge work force. It traced contacts of every
coronavirus, identified patient through the use of technology and investigating
teams, delivered test kits, supplied medical equipment and resources, and took
immediate action to have new hospitals (namely mobile cabin hospitals) with
thousands of hospital beds constructed. Just to give a quantitative idea of the
effectiveness of Chinese systematic response to the pandemic, it is suffice to
mention that the “Lei Shen Shan” and the “Huo Shen Shan” hospitals with 2,500
hospital beds, which are structures in line with high international standards, were
built from scratch in the city of Wuhan in only 10 days. Furthermore, the action
plan did not neglect rural areas, whereby mass prevention and control were
conducted via the coordination between local organizations and village doctors. At
the same time, since the initial outbreak of COVID-19 was conﬁrmed, information

44 It is worth mentioning that, for instance, National Health Commission of China issued seven
different edition guidelines for COVID-19 diagnosis and treatment from the beginning of January to
the beginning of March.
45 China’s Fight against COVID-19, https://www.chinanews.com/shipin/2020ggkf/2020/0330/
131.shtml (last visited May 4, 2020).
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upon the management of epidemic was released to both WHO and other countries,
while China revised its infections count in the attempt not to leave undocumented
cases. Moreover, on the domestic side, the whole population was encouraged to
make use of modern social media and network platforms to spread ofﬁcial information about COVID-19 protection.
Thus, in the end, it can be concluded that China’s national and local legal
response strategy to COVID-19 epidemic was elaborated as a “coordinate management program” based on the virus peculiarities as resulting from the exchange of
information between the central and the local levels and supported by and based on
scientific evidence.46 Its unitary institutional approach grounded in the “rule of
emergency law” was capable to take rapid political choices in order to turn the law
in the books into law in action to protect human lives and values. As speciﬁed by the
head of the WHO emerging diseases and zoonosis unit – Maria van Kerkhove – in
reporting China’s classiﬁed control measures, Hubei, Wuhan and other parts of
China implemented differentiated control measures based on the assessment of the
outbreak. Different regions adopted different levels of prevention and control restrictions, and this strategy managed to avoid a complete national lockdown with all
the downsides of such measure.47

2.2 Italy’s Normative Response in Distress
Compared with the China’s coordination grounded in its “rule of emergency law”
above described, the analysis of the emergency measures adopted by the Italian
Government to counter the coronavirus epidemic produces a sense of disorientation. The architecture of the legal system, twisted in emergency, the use of unintelligible dogmatic categories and specialist language, the legal force of speciﬁc
provisions adopted, and a plethora of other factors are indeed puzzling not only to
the foreign lawyer but also to the Italian one. For these reasons, it is appropriate to
preface the critical analysis of the current global “state of exception” caused by the
COVID-19 and its geopolitical implications48 with a very succinct overview of the
Italian system of the sources of law followed by a more detailed report of the

46 See Liu Guanghua, Evidence-based Law: An Inter-disciplinary Approach between Law and
Evidence-based Science, 3 Library & Information 11–17 (2018).
47 “WHO calls for more efforts in epidemic prevention and control”, People’s Daily, March 27,
2020, at 16.
48 See infra Section 3.
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speciﬁc national regulations enacted to address the pandemic. The former is
intended to be a compass to focus our route on the intricate map of the latter.
2.2.1 Who Legislates in Italy? The Law-Making Authority under Conditions of
Ordinary Law
The Italian Constitution vests the legislative power in the Houses of Parliament
which represent the repository of popular sovereignty.49 This does not entail an
exclusive monopoly of Parliament over the legislative power. Under particular
circumstances, the Government is allocated the quasi-legislative authority to issue
acts having the force of law, i.e., decrees originating from the Executive power
which are nonetheless located at the same hierarchical level of ordinary statutory
law. These acts are the Legislative Decree (decreto legislativo) and the Decree-Law
(decreto legge). The former, widely adopted to discipline complex technical matters (e. g., ﬁnance sector, consumer law), is an example of delegated legislation in
which the Parliament outlines the legal framework (basic criteria, time-period etc.)
within which the Government is expected to draft its decree.50 Contrariwise, the
latter is not technically the result of a delegation of power. It represents, instead, an
exceptional hypothesis in which, due to a “case of exceptional necessity and
urgency”, the Government is empowered to perform the legislative function on its
own motion and under its political responsibility. Decree-laws are immediately
effective, but they retroactively lose effect if not ratiﬁed and transposed into law by
the Parliament within 60 days from their publication in the Ofﬁcial State Gazette
(Gazzetta Ufﬁciale).51
The Italian Constitution, as for instance the Japanese Basic Law, does not
contemplate specific emergency clauses nor does it recognize a state of emergency.
It merely provides for a state of war which has not been invoked for the current
49 It. Const. Art. 70 reads: “The law-making function shall be exercised collectively by both
Houses”.
An ofﬁcial English version of the Italian Constitution is available on the website of the Italian
Senate at https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf.
50 It. Const. Art. 76 reads: “The law-making function may not be delegated to the Government
unless principles and criteria have been established and then only for a limited time and for
speciﬁc purposes”.
51 It. Const. Art. 77 reads: “The Government may not, without a delegation from Parliament, issue
a decree having force of law. When the Government, in case of necessity and urgency, adopts
under its own responsibility a temporary measure, it shall submit such measure to Parliament for
enactment. During dissolution, Parliament shall be convened within ﬁve days after any such
measure has been submitted. Such a measure shall lose effect from the beginning unless it is
transposed into law by Parliament within 60 days of its publication. Parliament may regulate by
law the legal relations arisen from a rejected decree”.
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pandemic, be it designed for other classes of emergencies.52 The latter is the only
case in which the Government is granted a full-ﬂedged constitutional power to
legislate. But even under these exceptional circumstances the Executive is not
vested of full unlimited powers but just of the “necessary powers” which, however,
are the result of exceptional delegation from the Parliament.
At an inferior level in the hierarchy of sources of law, under the Constitution,
the statutes and the acts having force of law, one finds the so-called secondary
sources of law. Brutally simplifying for the purposes of this Article, secondary
sources of law can be described as regulations issued by the Executive power in the
form of decrees (Ministerial Decrees, Decrees of the President of the Council of
Ministers, Governmental Decrees in the form of Decrees of the President of the
Republic) whose ordinary function is to implement primary legislation.53
2.2.2 The Italian “Measures on Containment and Management of the
Epidemiological Emergency”: A Normative Account
After a range of respiratory illnesses of unknown cause were detected in the Chinese province of Hubei in December 2019, and later reported to the WHO local
office, and further to the onset of diseases allegedly related to the same etiology
occurring outside of the Chinese territory, the coronavirus – later named COVID-19
– was declared “public health emergency of international concern” by the World
Health Organization on 30 January 2020.54 On the very same day of this declaration, the Italian Ministry of Health issued an ordinance precautionarily banning
“air trafﬁc from China”,55 immediately followed, as of 31 January 2020, by a Resolution of the Council of Ministers declaring a six-month state of emergency on the

52 It. Const. Art. 78 reads: “Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the
necessary powers into the Government”. See Giuseppe de Vergottini, Guerra e Costituzione. Nuovi
Conﬂitti e Sﬁde alla Democrazia (2004).
53 For an introduction to the sources of Italian law in English, see Mario Comba, Constitutional
Law, in Introduction to Italian Law 47–51 (Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2002); The Italian
Legal System: An Introduction (Michael A. Livingston, Pier Giuseppe Monateri & Francesco Parisi
eds., 2nd ed., 2015); Introduction to Italian Public Law 195–218 (Giuseppe Franco Ferrari ed., 2nd
ed., 2018).
54 All the WHO declarations and outdates on coronavirus are available at https://www.who.int.
55 See Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, 30 January 2020, art. 1. All the relevant measures
adopted by the Italian Government are available online at https://www.governo.it/it/coronavirusnormativa.
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national territory.56 This resolution, invoking the application of a 2018 law related
to civil protection, was followed by a multi-phase action plan, undertaken under
the advice of a Scientiﬁc Technical Committee assessing the epidemiological risk at
every phase, whose aim is to take all the urgent measures to manage and contain
the epidemic.57 Namely, the plan is made of a Phase 1 designed to manage the most
critical stage of the pandemic; a Phase 2 contemplating a gradual relaxation of
containment measures; and a Phase 3 when a return to ordinary life will be
possible but only if new contagions progressively reach zero.
– Phase 1: From Regional to National Lockdown
Following the implementation of some urgent measures by the Italian
Department of Civil Protection, the establishment of ad-hoc Crisis Operative and
Scientific Technical Committees, and given the increase in cases of contagion in
the Lombardy and Veneto Regions, the Government decided to enact the DecreeLaw 6/2020 [hereinafter DL 6/2020] on February 23 with the objective of proactively
countering and containing the epidemiological emergency caused by COVID-19.
The said Decree, later converted with amendments by Law no. 13 of 5 March 2020,
empowered the competent local authorities of the enlisted places, whereby at least
one case of contagion was reported, to implement all the necessary restrictive
measures established to contain the contagion. Pursuant to Art. 1(2) of the DL
6/2020, those measures included – but were not limited to – 58travel restrictions
prohibiting any movement of natural persons entering or leaving the affected
territories (so-called “red areas”), the imposition of compulsory quarantine with
active surveillance upon those who had contacts with persons found to be positive
to the virus, the duty on the part of travelers arriving from epidemiologically risky
areas to disclose this circumstance to the local health authorities, bans on all
public and private gatherings, limitations on public and private transportation,
56 The “Resolution of the Council of Ministers relating to the health risk associated with the onset
of diseases caused by transmissible viral agents” dated 31 January 2020 entrusted the Head of the
Department Civil Protection with the coordination of the measures necessary to deal with the
emergency on the national territory expressly referring to the so-called Code of Civil Protection
(Legislative Decree, 2 January 2018 No. 1).
57 Pursuant to art. 43 of the ‘International Health Regulations 2005’, State Parties can implement:
“health measures, in accordance with their relevant national law and obligations under international law, in response to speciﬁc public health risks or public health emergencies of international concern” with the purported objective of achieving the same or greater level of health
protection than WHO recommendations. See International Health Regulations 2005 available
online at https://www.who.int/ihr/9789241596664/en/index.html.
58 Art. 2 of Decree-Law 23 February 2020 No. 6 overtly empowers the competent authorities to
implement further measures to prevent the diffusion of the epidemic pending the enactment of the
DPCM.
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suspension of educational services and activities in schools of all levels including
Universities and Institutions of higher education, suspension of in-person public
and private examination procedures, the closure of cultural institutes and all
commercial activities except those supplying basic necessities.
Given the explicit powers originally vested in the Prime Minister by art. 3(1) of
the DL 6/2020 to implement all the urgent measures with his own decrees, the
Decree-Law has been rapidly followed by an escalating sequence of Decrees of the
President of the Council of Minister [hereinafter DPCM]59 and, only at a later stage,
by other Decree-Laws.
More specifically, art. 1(1) of the DPCM of 8 March60 imposed severe restrictions on personal and economic freedoms and namely: a) extended the
aforementioned emergency measures to the whole Lombardy Region and to other
14 provinces located in Northern and Central Italy whereby any movement of
natural persons entering and leaving as well as crossing those territories was
prohibited being exceptions only admitted in cases of “well-grounded workrelated reasons or situations of need or movements for health reasons”; b) commanded a complete ban on the movement from their residence of persons subject
to quarantine or found to be positive to the virus; c) suspended all sort of public or
private events including sport competitions and activities except for the training
sessions of professional athletes participating in Olympic Games or other national
or international events provided that they take place in facilities closed to the
general public; d) suspended all civil and religious ceremonies including funerals;
e) imposed restrictions on opening and closing hours upon catering and bar activities with the obligation, under the manager’s responsibility and under penalty
of suspension of the activity in case of violation, to provide the conditions to
guarantee the possibility of respecting the interpersonal safety distance which is
legally estimated in at least one meter;61 f) permitted other commercial activities to
remain open as long as they could guarantee access in a restricted manner so to
avoid gathering of persons and respect the interpersonal safety distance.
Meanwhile, the evolution of the epidemiological situation registered an
asymmetrical normative response across Italian Regions and Municipalities,
whereby local authorities adopted a set of heterogeneous measures to stem the

59 As of May 23, the several DPCM are dated 23 February, 25 February, 1 March, 4 March, 8 March,
9 March, 11 March, 22 March, 1 April, 10 April, 26 April, 12 May, 17 May and 18 May.
60 An ofﬁcial English translation of the relevant DPCM is available on the website of the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/ministero/normativaonline/normati
va-altre-amministrazioni.html.
61 See Annex 1, letter (d) DPCM 8 March 2020.
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spread of coronavirus.62 These episodes of localism, reproducing on a smaller
scale the low degree of connection that can be observed at a supranational level
amongst EU Member States, triggered a response from the central Government.
Then, in the light of those episodes and especially in view of the increase in cases,
the Prime Minister, with the DPCM of 9 March,63 extended to the entire national
territory the restrictive measures that were previously prescribed just for the red
areas,64 substantially nationalizing limitations to personal freedom by prohibiting
any form of gathering in public places or places open to the public.
Starting from March 11, in conjunction with the statement by the WHO classifying coronavirus as ‘pandemic’ and calling on the different national governments to adopt aggressive action, a series of DPCM65 and the Decree-Law 19/2020
– later converted with amendments by Law no. 35 of 22 May 2020 which repealed
the previous DL 6/202066 – strongly tightened national containment measures. In
particular, the said acts provided for: the prohibition of any movement of natural
persons from the municipalities in which they were located (even outlawing return
to their permanent place of residence) being exceptions only admitted in cases of
proven occupational needs or situations of need or for health reasons; the total
ban, under pain of criminal sanctions, for persons subject to quarantine or fund
positive to the virus to move from their home or residence; the prohibition of any
form of assembly in public and private spaces; the closure of parks and gardens
and the prohibition of recreational activities (it was only permitted to carry out
motor activity individually and in the immediate vicinity of one’s residence); the
suspension of catering services and retail business activities with the sole exception of those selling foods and vital products (this however included alcohols and
cigarettes!) and those strictly functional to the management of the emergency
provided that interpersonal safety distance be guaranteed.67 The disproportionate
nature of these measures especially in areas of the country in which there were
virtually no cases, the feeble ground of their formal legitimacy and some episodes

62 Pursuant to Art. 3(2), Decree-Law 6/2020 pending the issuance of DPCM and only in cases of
“extreme necessity and urgency” Regions were allowed to implement the measures of the DL
6/2020.
63 See Art. 1, DPCM 9 March 2020.
64 Some of the restrictive measures had been already extended to the national territory by Art. 2
DPCM 8 March 2020.
65 See speciﬁcally Art. 1, DPCM 11 March, Art. 1, DPCM 22 March and DPCM 10 April.
66 Art. 5 of Decree-Law 25 March 2020 No 19 explicitly repeals the DL 6/2020 with the exception of
Article 3(6-bis) and Article 4.
67 See Art. 1 DPCM 10 April 2020.

Advantage in Emergency Law

19

of arbitrary enforcement by local police, have triggered substantial critique by a
number of lawyers, legal scholars and magistrates.68
–

Phase 2: The Gradual Relaxation of the Lockdown Measures

A first partial loosening of the aforesaid measures, previous to the official
beginning of the so-called “Phase 2”, occurred with the DPCM of 26 April.69 The said
decree, albeit introducing further measures like the explicit obligation to stay home
preemptively and limit social contacts for those who present respiratory symptoms
and a temperature above 37.5 °C (Art. 1(1) b),70 contemplated, starting from May 4,
the possibility to ease some of the restrictions on individual freedom (e. g., people
were allowed to meet relatives within the same region) and on business (notably
factories and construction sites) so to gradually reopen the country provided that
safety interpersonal distance is respected, gatherings prevented, and personal
protective equipment (PPE) used (PPE like face masks is made compulsory in closed
public places accessible to the public, including means of transport, and in any case
when it is not possible to guarantee the safety distance).71
“Phase 2” officially started on May 18 with a scheduled gradual resumption of
the productive, industrial and social activities staggered over a two-month
period.72 Besides approving a stimulus package to counter the economic and social
impact of coronavirus for business and families with an ad hoc Decree-Law,73 the
Italian Government designed the containment and prevention measures for Phase
2 mainly via the Decree-Law 16 May 2020, No. 33 [DL 33/2020] immediately followed by the DPCM of May 17. The said acts, in addition to further reafﬁrming the
mandatory nature of the rules on quarantine and social distancing74 and providing
for local authorities to monitor on a daily basis the epidemiological trends in their
territories and provide for guidelines accordingly, remove as of May 18 the restrictions on the freedom of movement within the same region in which people are
68 Ultimately, an independent Observatory for Constitutional Legality has been established:
www.generazionifuture.org.
69 DPCM 26 April 2020 partially replaced DPCM 10 April 2020 and was effective from 4 May 2020 to
17 May 2020, with the exception of some speciﬁc provisions (Article 2 paras 7, 9 and 11, which were
in effect from 27 April 2020 cumulatively to the provisions of the Decree 10 April 2020).
70 Under art. 1(1) b DPCM 10 April 2020 it was only a recommendation. The same provision is now
contained in DPCM 17 May 2020, Art. 1(a).
71 See Art. 3(2) DPCM 26 April 2020.
72 A concise outline of Phase 2 measures in English can be found online on the website of the
Ministry of Health at https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioFaqNuovo
Coronavirus.jsp?lingua=english&id=230.
73 See Decree-Law 19 May 2020, No. 34.
74 See Art. 1(6)–(10), Decree-Law 16 May 2020, No. 33; Art. 1 DPCM 17 May.
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located and, dating from June 3, allow travels to and from abroad as well as interregional travels which thus may be limited only by measures taken in accordance
with the principles of adequacy and proportionality to the actual epidemiological
risk present in those areas and in the view of EU and international obligations.
Accordingly, regions and local authorities are empowered to adopt guidelines and
protocols or set a different timing for the relaxation of restrictions in view of the
particular epidemiological conditions and trends of their territories.
2.2.3 In the Labyrinth of Minos: The Italian Emergency-Based Legislation and
Constitutional Disorder
Even at a superficial scrutiny, the incremental body of ‘urgent measures on
containment and management of the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19’
foreground a common denominator: in the majority of cases such measures
have been implemented in the form of decrees of the President of the Council of
Ministers.
In particular, by prohibiting the movement of persons across the national
territory and banning any form of human aggregation, the sequence of DPCM
– especially in Phase 1 – patently curbed some basic freedoms which are the
cornerstones of the Italian Bill of Rights and namely: personal liberty (art. 13), the
right to travel freely in any part of the country (art. 16), the freedom of assembly
(art. 17), the freedom of religious beliefs (art. 18); freedom of speech and expression
(art. 21).75 Furthermore, the wide powers granted to Regional Governors to master
the pandemic created possible conﬂicts between central and local governments as
to the interpretation and implementation of emergency provisions. These speciﬁc
aspects have raised doubts amongst some commentators as to the legitimacy and
opportunity of such decrees to such an extent that they impel a radical questioning
of the boundaries of the Executive power in times of emergency.76
To begin with, the massive use of sub-primary legislation to enact severe limitations upon constitutionally recognized civil liberties and personal freedoms represents an almost unprecedented anomaly in the history of Republican Italy.77
Indeed, in the aftermath of World War II, the Italian Constitution framers showed the
clear intention to prevent the recurrence of the despicable rights violations experienced during Fascism. In formal respect to the Constitution (the Albertine Statute),
75 See Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G. Carrozza, Marta Cartabia & Andrea Simoncini, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context 95 ff. (2016).
76 See Sabino Cassese, La Pandemia non è una guerra. I pieni poteri al Governo non sono legittimi, Il
Dubbio (April 24, 2020).
77 For a general introduction, see Giuliano Amato, The Constitution, in The Oxford Handbook of
Italian Politics 71–81 (Erik Jones & Gianfranco Pasquino eds., 2015).
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Fascism deployed the rhetorical guise of constitutional reforms to put individual
freedom at the mercy of the Executive.78 In view of these considerations, the Italian
Constituent Fathers decided to shield civil liberties with a statutory reserve. In
particular, according to this rule of law shield, the Italian Constitution allows
exceptional restrictions on liberties for health and safety or security reasons in more
than one provision (e. g., in art. 14 and 16 Const.) but it speciﬁes the authority
empowered to do so, the kind of limits that can be attached to liberties, and it requires
those restrictions be established in the forms and manners provided by the law.
Judged on this standard, the current wide use of DPCM has inaugurated a “new
constitutional era” whose penumbras obfuscate its lights.79 DPCM are neither law
nor do they belong to the acts having the force of law (Legislative Decrees and
Decree-Laws). They are just secondary sources and, as such, given their lower
hierarchical level, they are not supposed to repeal, conﬂict with, nor derogate from
the Constitution and primary legislation. The doubts as to the opportunity to
massively resort to such sources grow deeper if we consider that DPCM are not
subject to the preemptive constitutional control of the President of the Republic.
Indeed, DPCM need not to be signed by the President of the Republic who, instead,
in its capacity of guarantor of the Italian Constitution, is called upon to sign laws
(and acts having the force of law) for their promulgation, and can refuse to sign a
bill into law if she deems that it violates the Constitution.
It is true that all DPCM are presented – even in titles – as mere technical means
to implement the Decree-Laws which are pieces of primary legislation. This
formalistic answer, however, neglects the fact that, at the operational level, DPCM
are the sources of law to which the adoption of the containment measures is
delegated.80
From a different perspective, one could critically notice that the vague
description of the powers to adopt containment measures via DPCM originally
78 See Antonio Padoa Schioppa, A History of Law in Europe. From the Early Middle Ages to the
Twentieth Century 626 ff. (2017). It is worth noting that in the preliminary works of the Italian
Constitution, a proposal was made to introduce a provision overtly banning the possibility to
declare a state of siege and adopt measures aimed at suspending constitutional guarantees, but
the proposal was later abandoned and not included in the ﬁnal version. See on the point, Sergio
Bova, L’elaborazione della Carta Costituzionale nel Comitato di Redazione, in La Fondazione della
Repubblica. Dalla Costituzione Provvisoria all’Assemblea Costituente 305, at 329 ff. (Enzo Cheli
ed., 1979).
79 Chiara Tripodina, La costituzione al tempo del coronavirus, Costituzionalismo.it 78 (2020). See
also Ilaria Massa Pinto, La Tremendissima Lezione Del Covid-19 (Anche) Ai Giuristi. Fiat Iustitia et
Pereat Mundus Oppure Fiat Iustitia ne Pereat Mundus?, Questione Giustizia (March 18, 2020);
Umberto Ronga, Il Governo nell’Emergenza (Permanente). Sistema Delle Fonti e Modello Legislativo
a Partire dal Caso COVID-19, Nomos 1 (2020).
80 See supra.
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bestowed upon the Prime Minister by art. 3(1) Decree-Law 6/2020 and art. 2(1)
Decree Law 19/202081 somewhat recalls what an English common lawyer would
call an “Henry VIII clause”, that is to say a clause enabling ministers to directly act
avoiding close parliamentary scrutiny. This aspect entails a clear marginalization
of Parliament and of the Judiciary.82 Notably, Law no. 35 of 22 May 2020, in converting the DL 19/2020, inserted an amendment which explicitly provides that the
Prime Minister has to introduce the contents of its emergency decrees taken under
DL 19/2020 to the Parliament in advance to their adoption in order to hear their
recommendations or, if it is not possible, to report to the Parliament on the said
measures every fortnight. This clause, besides introducing a new form in the
communications between the Branches of Government whose legal implications
should be deepened, voices the need of the Parliament to be more involved in the
emergency.83 Moreover, it is worth noticing that the Decree-law powers to adopt
containment measures are not vested in the whole Executive Branch as a political
body, but in the person of the Prime Minister. It is an anomaly given that Italy has a
parliamentary system and not a presidential one. It follows that the Prime Minister,
in such form of government, is a primus inter pares in the Council of Ministers,
where the Executive power (accountable to the Parliament) rests.
Nor can it be argued that the provisions contained in the emergency DPCM
are merely technical recommendations or organizational measures lacking a
direct binding and coercive force. Not only did the exceptional extension of the
restrictive measures to the national territory originally occur via the DPCM:
additionally, failure to comply with the containment measures set out in the
Decree Law 6/2020, before being decriminalized by the subsequent Decree Law
19/2020,84 was punished under art. 650 of the Italian Criminal Code entailing
both a reclusive and an administrative sanction.85 And even the more recent
Decree Law 33/2020 provides that the violation of quarantine measures by a
person who has tested positive to COVID-19 shall entail criminal sanctions for

81 For major details, see supra the description of the measures adopted in Phase 1.
82 Notably, waiting for the implementation of technological tools allowing a broader use of
e-trials, Art. 82 Decree-Law 17 March 2020, No. 18 and art. 36 Decree-Law 8 April 2020, n. 23
temporarily suspended court activities until May 11.
83 See Art. 2(1) Law 22 May 2020, no. 35.
84 Art. 4(1) Decree-Law 25 March 2020, No. 19 replaces criminal sanctions with administrative
sanction (a ﬁne ranging from 400 up to 4,000 Euros and closure orders for up to 30 days in case of
businesses and ﬁrms found in breach of the said measures) which are applied retroactively to the
minimum extent to the misconducts committed before the Decree came into force (Art. 4(8)).
85 See Art. 4(2) DPCM 8 March 2020.
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the offender.86 Because of the importance of constitutional guarantees in
criminal matters, some commentators raised doubts over the formal legitimacy
of the legal ban on the movement from their residence of persons tested
positive to the virus as it is contained and formulated in the Decree Laws.87
This is for such obligation does not just limit freedom of movement but curtails
personal liberty which is safeguarded under art. 13(2) of the Italian Constitution by a twofold constitutional guarantee prescribing that any restriction
thereof must be determined in detail by the law (statutory reserve) and be
ordered by a reasoned judicial order (judiciary reserve).88
Finally, it is worth reminding that Government representatives at the local level
(so-called Prefetti) are under legal duty to monitor the implementation of the measures
established by the DPCM with the possible use of police forces. In strict compliance
with such obligations, law enforcement authorities established checkpoints at airports, train stations and highways to eventually collect self-declaration forms. In such
forms, persons moving across the national territory, before the relaxation of those
restrictions, were obliged to specify, under pain of legal sanctions in case of false
declaration, the purpose of their travel, their destination, the fact that they have
knowledge of the measures to manage and contain the epidemiological emergency
and that they neither are under quarantine nor were they found positive to the virus.
To make a long story short, the legal handling of the matter by the Italian
Government would be deemed a legal fiasco if judged according to the standards
of liberal constitutionalism. A long time ago, one of the Italian Constituent
Fathers claimed that the Constitution “is not a machine that once started can go
on by itself […] To make it move you need to put in fuel every single day, you
need to put in your commitment, your spirit, your will to keep these promises,
your sense of responsibility”.89 This moment deﬁnitely calls for commitment and
responsibility, because what emerges from the labyrinth of provisions enacted to
counter the coronavirus is a constitutional disorder. As already occurred in the
past,90 the Executive is governing by decree with an increasing frequency thus
causing a centralization of power that, while formally retaining the framework of
the institutions and the constitutional narrative, visibly twists the constitutional
86 See Art. 2(3), Decree-Law 16 May 2020, No. 33 (providing for a prison sentence of 3-to-18-month
period and a ﬁne of between 500 and 5,000 euros for transgressors).
87 See Gian Luigi Gatta, Emergenza COVID-19 e “Fase 2”: Misure Limitative e Sanzioni nel D.L. 16.5.
2020, n. 33 (Nuova Disciplina della Quarantena), Sistema Penale (May 18, 2020).
88 On this twofold constitutinal guarantee, see amplius Barsotti, Cartabia, Carrozza & Simoncini,
supra note 75, at 107–113.
89 Piero Calamandrei, Discorso ai giovani sulla Costituzione [1955], in Lo Stato Siamo Noi 6 (2011).
90 See Barsotti, Cartabia, Carrozza & Simoncini, supra note 75, at 168 ff.; Comba, supra note 53 at
49–51; Mary L. Volcansek, Constitutional Politics in Italy. The Constitutional Court 34–51 (1999).
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equilibrium between the legislative and the executive bodies.91 This contention
draws considerable support from the very fact that the above scenario has
triggered the reaction of more than 200 eminent legal scholars and professionals
who wrote a public collective letter to their fellow jurist, the Prime Minister, in
which, albeit acknowledging the seriousness of the pandemic and the necessity
of effective actions, they overtly demand a restoration of constitutional guarantees and the respect of the safeguards provided for in the ECHR.92
A deeper understanding of the current legal landscape is then crucial especially in times of extra-ordinary political law,93 when political participation is
suspended, emergency legislation rises to the “Supreme Law of the Land”, and
restrictions to fundamental freedoms and civil rights are carried out with a potential subversion of the ordinary legal and constitutional order.

3 The Legal Dimension of the Pandemic between
Ordinariness and Extra-Ordinariness
The COVID-19 has rapidly escalated in a worldwide crisis with severe effects in
almost every facet of society. Its virulence has been described alternatively as
democratic, nonpartisan, or totalitarian in that it spares no effort to infiltrate each
aspect of human life at every latitude. From North to South, from east to west of the
globe, the coronavirus has literally shaken the world to such an extent that it could
be seen as a turning point or, at least, as an opportunity to reflect.94 It has altered
economic equilibria (and orientations) causing a recession of historic proportion in
the Eurozone95 and in the U.S., and a visible drop in growth even in the seemingly
unstoppable Chinese economy, whose GDP is experiencing a contraction for the

91 On the controversial relation between constitutionalism and political populism, see recently,
Italian Populism and Constitutional Law. Strategies, Conﬂicts and Dilemmas (Giacomo delle
Donne, Giuseppe Martinico, Matteo Monti & Fabio Pacini eds., 2020). See also Alessandro Simoni,
Limiting Freedom During the Covid-19 Emergency in Italy: Short Notes on the New “Populist Rule of
Law”, 20 Global Jurist 1 (2020).
92 The text of the letter is available online at https://generazionifuture.org/bacheca/lettera_
aperta.php.
93 See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 16 ff.
94 See Slavoj Žižek, Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World (2020).
95 The Economic Forecast Spring 2020 issued by the European Commission projects a record
overall contraction in the euro area economy estimated around 7.4 percent in 2020 with a probable
rebound and an uncertain recovery in 2021. The document is available online at https://ec.europa.
eu/info/sites/info/ﬁles/economy-ﬁnance/ip125_en.pdf.
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ﬁrst time since 1976.96 What appears to be the most striking aspect of this
pandemic, however, is that it has de facto and de jure suspended ordinary politics,
triggered the massive enactment of emergency-based legislation with visible restrictions to civil liberties, and even modiﬁed basic human relations by imposing
isolation, celebrating technology and virtual space as the most readily available
exit strategy to get back to normal, and transforming spaces of social aggregation
(streets, squares, markets, courtrooms, Stock Exchanges etc.) into waste lands
whereby a previously unheard-of deafening silence resounds. In this respect, from
an anthropological point of view the homo pandemicus could be seen as the last
stage in the evolution (rectius involution) of homo sapiens towards a far-reaching
and worrying technologization of human activities.
This gargantuan subversion of ordinariness has conjured memories of dark
times that were deemed to belong to a distant past and, at the same time, originated the need for new narratives capable of voicing and making sense of this
tragic experience.97 In particular, the logic of war and the allure of science have
so much captured everyday language to become part of a new common sense
which, as we know, is not just a vague sense of reality (right/wrong, necessary/
possible etc.), but rather “the sense that founds community”98 and reconnects that
community to a shared set of meanings. In this cultural transformation, a dogmatic
vision of science has become the novel “theory of everything”,99 and wartime metaphors have seized the political vocabulary so that almost ubiquitous is the idea that
we are actually ﬁghting a WWIII against an “invisible enemy”.100

96 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-poll/china-on-slow-road-to-recovery
-but-recession-risk-is-high-reuters-poll-idUSKCN22502B.
97 See e. g., Together in a Sudden Strangeness. America’s Poets Respond to the Pandemic (Alice
Quinn ed., 2020); Fang Fang, Wuhan Diary. Dispatches from a Quarantined City (Michael Berry
trans., 2020).
98 Hans–Georg Gadamer, Truth and method 19 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans.,
2004) (1960).
99 See infra Section 3.2.
100 This type of metaphors abounds in several political statements. For instance, U.S. President
Trump deﬁned coronavirus as an “invisible enemy” (see Remarks by President Trump, Vice
President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Brieﬁng available online at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-presidentpence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-brieﬁng-3/); and so did the French President
Emmanuel Macron when he declared: “Nous sommes en guerre, en guerre sanitaire, certes. Nous
ne luttons ni contre une armée ni contre une autre nation, mais l’ennemi est là, invisible, insaisissable et qui progresse” (see Gaïdz Minassian, COVID-19, ce que cache la rhétorique guerrière, Le
Monde, 8 April 2020). The Chinese President Xi Jinping in February promised to the Chinese
population that he would have won the “people’s war” against coronavirus.
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The use of such metaphorical language should not be minimized for not only
do metaphors influence the way we think and make sense of new experiences, but
also the way we act.101 And in this scenario it cannot go unnoticed that the war on
coronavirus is rapidly turning into a feud between U.S. and China over world
hegemony that is increasingly assuming the likeness of a novel Cold War. On the
battleﬁeld of the pandemic, beside calling WHO “China-centric”,102 President
Trump sent a letter to the director of WHO in which he chastised China’s handling
of coronavirus as non-transparent, threatened to make the temporary suspension
of United States contributions permanent, and accused the agency of failing to
respond to the COVID-19 outbreak.103 Chinese government, on the other hand, not
only ﬁred back on all American allegations,104 but through the intervention of
President Xi Jinping at the 73rd UN’s World Health Assembly pledged to make any
coronavirus vaccine a “global public good”.
Predictably, besides its obvious geopolitical implications, the echo of this war
talk together with the image of COVID-19 as belonging to the domain of the
‘exception-al’ rather than to the domain of the ‘norm-al’, could not but deeply affect
the physiology of the legal discourse.
Not only does crisis rhetoric justify, but it appears to nearly imply exercises of
power that transcend conventional legal restraints.105 In fact the theory according
to which “the complex system of government of the democratic, constitutional
state is essentially designed to function under normal, peaceful conditions” so that
its temporary suspension or alteration in times of crisis can be indispensable for
maintaining the democratic order is not a new one.106 And, in this very delicate
equilibrium between the rule and the exception lies the core of the problem.

101 See George Lakeoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980); Id., Philosophy in the
Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999).
102 In explaining why he did not participate to the WHO virtual meeting convened on May 18,
President Trump replied: “I chose not to give a statement. I think they’ve done a very sad job in the
last period of time. And again, the United States pays them $450 million a year; China pays them
$38 million a year, and they’re a puppet of China. They’re China-centric, to put it nicer. But they’re
a puppet of China”. The transcripts are available on the White House website at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/remarks-president-trump-roundtable-restaurantexecutives-industry-leaders/.
103 Donald Trump published the letter on twitter and the text is available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1262577580718395393.
104 See https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1777545.shtml.
105 For a historical overview of the use of emergency powers, see Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni
Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (2006).
106 Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies 5 (1948).
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Both modern capitalism and political authoritarianism have always seen opportunity in crises. Capitalist structures proliferate in times of crisis because they
open up new frontiers of wealth accumulation and profiteering.107 Politicians, on
the other hand, recurrently use emergencies as exculpatory avenues to be thrusted
into the center of public life and gain political consensus. This is because framing
rapid and even unconventional choices in times of emergency belongs to the duties
of politics. The attempt to manipulate the momentum and seize extraordinary
powers that have little to do with the crisis, however, sadly belongs to the longterm game of electoral politics. And this is even more evident in a global technocratic era whereby the risk that a momentaneous suspension of legal ordinariness
produces long-term changes in the permanent structure of government necessarily
assumes a supranational character. The easy manufacture of consent of citizens
around the propriety of violating rights and the following tendency to reshape the
law anew under the legitimizing rhetoric created by a state of exception represents
the possible dark side of every emergency.
To exemplify this continuous historical tendency, it is enough to briefly
recollect two major episodes, one from the past and one from the present. The
former refers to how the Nazis capitalized on the fire of the German Parliament of
1933. Playing on the fears of communism, Hitler supported the rumor that the fire
was set by the German Communist Party and that there was a serious threat to
German institutions. Having convinced the then President von Hindenburg to use
its constitutional emergency powers (art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution) to sign a
decree which canceled basic civil liberties of citizens (the Reichstagsbrandverordnung, commonly known as the “Reichstag Fire Decree”), he then
used the following state of exception as the legal ground to mute political opponents, and commence his seizure of power (the so-called Machtergreifung) and his
road to the building of the Third Reich.108 The latter relates to the post-9/11
legislation and to the military commissions of Guantanamo Bay that sadly became
the symbol of the Bush administration approach to the War on Terror and, at the
same time, represented a hideous legal blackhole that turned the U.S. (and other
countries) from cribs of the rule of law to human rights outlaws.109 Indeed, albeit

107 See Anwar Shaikh, Capitalism. Competition, Conﬂict, Crises (2016). See also infra amplius
Section 3.2.
108 See Benjamin Carter Hett, Burning the Reichstag: An Investigation into the Third Reich’s
Enduring Mystery (2014); Michael Head, Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice: The Long
Shadow of Carl Schmitt 42ff. (2015).
109 See Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2013).
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no ofﬁcial and real war was ever declared by U.S. Congress,110 the rhetoric of the
war on terror managed, in the name of national security, to dehumanize detainees,111 create double discriminatory legal standards for citizens and aliens,112
legitimize despicable unremedied violations of human rights, and inaugurate a
new era of legal repression and democratic decline that has turned a temporary
emergency into a permanent state of exception.113
Since, after all, law and legal thought are always stretched between continuity
and discontinuity, the legacy of the authoritarian experiences of the past and the
alarming ghostly undercover traces of such attitudes in the present should inform
and enlighten every analysis of our age.114
In view of the above considerations, the step from a public health emergency
to the possibility of a prolonged state of exception is not that long and remote.
Thus, particular attention should be paid to what gets lost in the current transition
from legal “ordinariness” to “extra-ordinariness”. Emergency can indeed be quite
a distortive magnifying glass through which to look at social phenomena. While
shedding some light on a specific frame (the present condition), it may project a
long shadow on the bigger picture (its future consequences).

3.1 “When Words Lose Their Meaning”: The Legal
Phenomenology of the Pandemic
In the attempt to convey the sense of bewilderment and disorder brought by the
war upon Greek city-states, in his History of Peloponnesian War, Thucydides said
that words themselves had lost their ordinary meaning to fit in the dramatic change
of events.115
This evocative expression perfectly captures the chaos provoked by the coronavirus and its implications for the democracy machine in Western capitalist countries. The epidemiological emergency has, indeed, imprinted itself upon the nations’
psyche worldwide and the securitarian rhetoric surrounding it is having an unprecedented impact on the political, legal, and ethical vocabulary dominant in
110 See Bruce Ackerman, This is not a War, 113 Yale L. J. 1871 (2004).
111 See Judith Butler, Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004).
112 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on
Terrorism (2003).
113 Agamben, supra note 5, at 3.
114 See e. g., Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism
Over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Christin Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003).
115 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of
Language, Character, and Community 3 et passim (1984).

Advantage in Emergency Law

29

Western democracies. Let us consider, for instance, social-distancing rules, the
suspension of regular elections (as e. g., in Bolivia) and referendums,116 the closure of
the (Supreme) Courts’ doors, and even the rescheduling of cases of major public
interest (e. g.,: in the U.S. the Supreme Court postponed the case concerning the
release of President Trump’s ﬁnancial records),117 or the delegation of emergency
powers to local authorities. These are just few examples of the extent to which the very
notions of justice, liberty, separation of powers, together with the other predicaments
forming the cornerstones of the Western legal tradition are visibly changing their
acknowledged meaning to keep with precautions adopted in response to COVID-19.118
This process, one could argue, is not new, but rather cyclical in the history of
(legal) ideas. Whenever a set of events of huge scale disrupts the canonical state of
things in the world – habits, customs, laws, economies – the language deployed up
to that moment to make sense of it loses its descriptive power so that a narrative
vacuum, and the need for a new vocabulary, surfaces. Legal modernity, for
instance, has created its own mythology rooted in the language of reason, science,
neutrality, calculability, individualism, and universal rights which charged the
law with the symbolic meanings we are more familiar with today.119 And this new
legal consciousness inevitably entailed a clear-cut rupture with the past. The
“epic”120 of the medieval world was, indeed, subverted by the narrative strength of
116 See e. g., the U.K. Coronavirus Act 2020, secs. 59–64 (postponing local, mayoral and police
elections due in May 2020 until May 2021).
117 In keeping with public health precautions in response to COVID-19, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced, for the ﬁrst time since the Spanish Inﬂuenza of 1918, the postponement of its March
and April sittings of oral arguments. The press releases of the Supreme Court upon Coronavirus
emergency are available online at https://www.supremecourt.gov/announcements/COVID-19.
aspx.
118 On the basic common values of the West, the classic readings remain Harold J. Berman, Law
and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983); and Peter Stein & John
Shand, Legal Values in Western Society (1974).
119 On the mythology of legal modernity and its theoretical conceptualization, see e multis Paolo
Grossi, Mitologie giuridiche della modernità (2007); Jacques Lenoble & Francois Ost, Droit, Mythe
et Raison: Essai sur la Dérive Mytho-logique de la Rationalité Juridique (1980) part of which is
summarized in English in Id., Founding Myths in Legal Rationality, 49 Mod. L. Rev. 530 (1986);
David Luban, Legal Modernism (1997). For a clear and concise account of this historical dynamic,
see Fritjof Capra & Ugo Mattei, The Ecology of Law: Toward a legal System in Tune with Nature and
Community 71ff. (2015).
120 For this use of the term “epic”, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Forward:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983), explaining that: “No set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every
constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a
world in which we live”.
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Modernity which turned the law both into the emblem of a new legal order where
justice was to be governed sub lege (rule of law) and not sub homine (rule of men),
and in the working tool for the construction of a new social order – the capitalist
society – whose economic spirit121 was soon to become the religion of the modern
era.122 Generally speaking, the Western legal tradition – and mutatis mutandis the
same can be said of other legal traditions informed by the circular dialectic between past and present123 – is born of a revolution and over the centuries has been
“periodically interrupted and transformed by revolutions”.124
So, what is so peculiar and destabilizing in the ongoing legal transformation
triggered by the coronavirus pandemic? First and foremost, its own phenomenology in terms of time (its immediate chance-enhancing capability), space (its
global magnitude) and origin (its authoritative foundation).
As to the time coordinate, what up to 30 January 2020 would have been generally
deemed and talked of as illegitimate violations of civil liberties more consonant with
totalitarian regimes than with civilized democracies – e. g., national lockdowns, the
unrestricted use of drones for domestic surveillance, mass surveillance of mobile
phones, or the issuance of government orders imposing severe restrictions on the
same constitutional liberties forming the bulwark of almost every declaration of rights
at both national and international level125 – have been meanwhile legitimized and
transformed into a set of “necessary urgent measures” almost over the course of a day.
As to the space coordinate, these measures are being enforced worldwide with
a good degree of standardization by executive-dominated regimes even in nonexecutive-driven systems in spite of the normal interplay of political forces.126 And
this harmonized response represents quite an anomaly from an historical
perspective. The tension between the respect of legal ordinariness and the necessity to bend and suspend it in order to provide an effective response to a crisis is
by no means an institutional novelty. Questions and debates around the status of
constitutions in times of emergency have, indeed, loomed throughout the legal

121 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism [1905] (Talcott Parsons
transl., 1930).
122 See Walter Benjamin, Capitalism as Religion [1921], in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings
(1913–1926) 288–91 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 1996).
123 See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (4th ed.,
2010).
124 See Berman, supra note 118, at 1.
125 See e multis Art. 2, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens (1789); Arts. 18–21,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Arts. 6–19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of The
European Union (2000).
126 See e. g., supra, Section 2.
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history of countries recurrently under different forms.127 But different legal systems
normally adopt emergency regimes that are deeply rooted in their national history
and are in a path-dependency relation with their institutional peculiarities and
with the ideal-typical self-perception of their legal tradition.
To illustrate with few examples, the U.S. constitution, besides implying a
more active presidential role in addressing emergencies,128 contains a fairly
rudimentary emergency regulatory scheme providing that habeas corpus can be
suspended in cases of “Rebellion or Invasion”.129 Correspondently, in its choice
not to exclusively concentrate explicit extraordinary powers in a branch of
government, at least at a federal level, the American constitution leaves crisis
supervision to the system of checks and balances and, especially, to the “least
dangerous branch”,130 that is to the judiciary. The court system is the institution
that, since the dawn of the American constitutional tradition, has been called
upon to protect citizens’ rights and control over the legitimacy of executive
actions in view of the fact that the “Constitution of the United States is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances”.131 The
major role played by the courts in social processes is a hallmark of the common
law tradition, and after World War II it has been the major trigger of US global
legal hegemony132. On this reading, the very idea that a decentralized system of
Courts, and not primarily some form of bureaucratic, centralized top – down
choice – making arrangements (e. g., legislators, administrative agencies etc.)
should be entrusted with the function of adapting the law to changing social
needs, even under exceptional circumstances, is deeply connected to the texture
(and self-perception)133 of the U.S. system and to the common law tradition at
127 For a general overview, see Oren Gross, Constitutions and Emergency Regimes, in Comparative
Constitutional Law 334 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan
Voigt, The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions, 16 Int.’l J. Const. L. 101 (2018). For an informed
and informative comparative analysis of constitutional and statutory emergency provisions in the
time of coronavirus, see recently Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, States of Emergencies (Part I &
II), in Harv. L. Rev. Blog, 17–20 April 2020.
128 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency
Powers, 2 Int’l J. Const. L. 210, 213 ff. (2004).
129 See the U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 9(2).
130 The obvious reference is to Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd ed., 1986).
131 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866).
132 See Mattei, supra note 26.
133 See e. g., the insightful analysis of Bruce Ackerman, We the People 3. The Civil Rights Revolution (2014) (arguing that the real difference in the civil rights revolution was made by the passage
of laws and by the active participation and support of the American polity).
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large. On the one hand, it shows the historical faith in the resilient and adaptive
character of the common law which always «works itself pure and adapts itself
to the needs of a new day».134 On the other hand, it elucidates the public trust in
the common lawyers conceived of as the “oracles”135 and “ofﬁcial ministers”136
of its tradition whose work is essential to the furtherance of justice even in the
case of errors, because the good in their actions «remains the foundation on
which new structures will be built», whereas mistakes «will be rejected and cast
off in the laboratory of the years».137
In France, instead, both a statutory law originally enacted during the Algerian
crisis138 and the constitution explicitly provide for exceptional powers to the President
of the Republic in case of an état d’urgence, when there is a serious threat to the French
nation and institutions.139 It is clear, then, that the French emergency regimes,
although later amended to concede a major supervisory role to the Conseil constitutionnel140 and to meet the new challenges posed by terrorist threats to national
security,141 reﬂect in their original form the historical conditions that were present at
birth of the Fifth Republic, the preeminent role of the President who is granted a quasimonarchical leadership,142 and the political charisma of General de Gaulle.

134 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 140 (1940).
135 See John P. Dawson, The Oracles of Law (1968).
136 See John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae 9 (Andrew Amos ed., 1825).
137 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process 178 (1921).
138 See Loi n 55–385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence.
139 Fr. Const. Art. 16(1) reads: “When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the
nation, the integrity of its territory, or the fulﬁllment of its international commitments are under
grave and immediate threat and when the proper functioning of the constitutional governmental
authorities is interrupted he President of the Republic shall take the measures demanded by these
circumstances after ofﬁcial consultation with the Prime Minister, the presidents of the Assemblies,
and the Constitutional Council”.
An English version of the constitution is available on the website of the French Constitutional
Council at https://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/sites/default/ﬁles/as/root/bank_mm/anglais/
constiution_anglais_oct2009.pdf.
140 In 2008 a constitutional law (Loi constitutionnelle no 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de
modernization des institutions de la Ve République) added a sixth paragraph to Fr. Const. Art. 16
which reads: “After 30 days of the exercise of such emergency powers, the matter may be referred
to the Constitutional Council by the President of the National Assembly, the President of the
Senate, 60 Members of the National Assembly or 60 Senators, so as to decide if the conditions laid
down in paragraph one still apply. The Council shall make its decision publicly as soon as possible.
It shall, as of right, carry out such an examination and shall make its decision in the same manner
after 60 days of the exercise of emergency powers or at any moment thereafter.”
141 See Karine Roudier, Albane Geslin & David-André Camous, L’État d’Urgence (2016); Olivier
Duhamel, Terrorism and Constitutional Amendment in France, 12 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 1 (2016).
142 See Maurice Duverger, La Monarchie Républicaine (1974).
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Similarly, in Germany the abuse of emergency powers occurred during the
Weimar Republic and the lessons from the horrors of Nazism firstly led to the
absence of open emergency clauses in the Bonn Constitution of 1949143 and, later,
to the incorporation of a detailed regulation of the emergency rule in the modern
German Grundgesetz aimed at establishing legal constraints to a prolonged concentration of powers. While providing for an extension of powers allowing the
federal government to handle emergencies effectively, the modern German Basic
Law is indeed designed not to be too intrusive in the sphere of fundamental
rights.144 By the same token, Spain and other Latin American countries which
historically experienced fascism and dictatorships have a detailed constitutional
emergency regime contemplating the proclamation and extension of different
levels of emergency (e. g., estado de alarma, estado de excepción, estado de sitio).145
These few examples show that there is a path followed by the different legal
systems in reacting to crises that is to a great extent determined by their own culture
and history.146 However, what is peculiar and makes the recent emergencies
different from the previous ones is that they are open-ended: they have a beginning
but there is no certain end to the exceptional conditions they create. The war on
terror, the war on coronavirus etc. are potentially endless not to mention that, from
being unusual occurrences, national and international emergencies are becoming
quite recurrent in the last decades above all if they are functional to a speciﬁc
political agenda.147 This open-endedness together with the globalization process are
likely to modify the space and time dimensions of the emergencies. Not only do they
confer on the effects of emergencies a broader supranational dimension that
necessarily cross geographical and geopolitical boundaries, but are the visible evidence that “the state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant
paradigm of government in contemporary politics”.148 As a consequence, it is not
thoroughly unlikely that, especially in the total absence of oppositional discourses
and active intellectual critiques, this new phenomenology of emergencies may divert

143 See Carl C. Schweitzer, Emergency Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 22 W. Pol. Q. 112
(1969).
144 See Christian Bumke & Andreas Voßkuhle, German Constitutional Law: Introduction, Cases,
and Principles 14ff. (2019).
145 See Gross, supra note 127, at 336 ff.
146 See Mattei, supra note 6.
147 See recently Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 Yale L. J. F. 590 (2020).
148 Agamben, supra note 5, at 3.
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legal systems from their traditional path and have the exception replace the norm
and the extra-ordinariness become the physiological condition of government.149
Ultimately, as to the origin of the semantic revolution produced by COVID-19
and its ramiﬁcations in political and legal discourses, it is allegedly to be found in a
declaration by the World Health Organization (WHO). Albeit a specialized agency
of the United Nations, the WHO is a scientiﬁc body which, therefore, strictly
speaking, cannot be held politically accountable. Still, it is acting as a de facto
global sovereign – a real dominus mundi capable of altering the constitutive elements of our political imagination and suspending legal ordinariness.150 It is thus
evident that we are currently living in a global state of exception that, were it not for
its catastrophic effects in real life, would perfectly ﬁt the dystopic literary worlds
portrayed by Aldous Huxley,151 George Orwell,152, or Aleksandr Bogdanov153 in
their masterpieces.
Notwithstanding the unconventional scenario outlined above, however, the
origin of the actual state of exception has been, to some extent, ‘normalized’ in the
public discourse. A self-assured chorus of media, politics, and even an influential
part of the intelligentsia seems to have elected, with a unanimous voice, scientific
committees as last instance courts having final jurisdiction over the legitimacy of
the regulatory framework to be enacted to master the emergency.
This phenomenon is blatantly evident in the fideism shown towards the policies suggested by the different Expert Boards and Scientific Advisory Groups
nominated by national governments to lead their responses to COVID-19. Just to

149 Some legal changes are visible for instance in France whereby, beside activating the emergency
clauses contained in the constitution, an ad-hoc statute (Law March 23, 2020, No. 2020-290) was
enacted. It introduced a new emergency regime called ‘state of health emergency’ (état d’urgence
sanitaire) according to which the Prime Minister can exceptionally limit some rights and liberties (e.
g., freedom of movement, requisition of goods) by decree to address the emergency. Commentators
noticed that this new état d’urgence sanitaire presents anomalies if compared to the other emergency
regimes. Notably, it entails a less incisive parliamentary involvement in the management of the
emergency for only extensions of the state of health emergencies exceeding one month must be
authorized by the Parliament as opposed to the Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 which provides that
state of emergency can only last for 12 days after which it is necessary for the Parliament to pass a law.
See Sébastien Platon, From One State of Emergency to Another – Emergency Powers in France,
Verfassungblog on Constitutional Matters (April 9, 2020), available online at https://
verfassungsblog.de/from-one-state-of-emergency-to-another-emergency-powers-in-france/.
150 See Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Dominus Mundi: Political Sublime and the World Order (2018).
151 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932).
152 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).
153 Aleksandr A. Bogdanov, Red Star: The First Bolshevik Utopia [1908] (Loren R. Graham &
Richard Stites eds., 1984).

Advantage in Emergency Law

35

mention few examples, China and Italy have resorted to Special Commissioners; 154
in the U.S., Trump administration’s response to COVID-19 has long relied on the
advice of an ad-hoc task force lead by the infectious disease specialist Anthony
Fauci; in the U.K., the SAGE (Scientiﬁc Advisory Groups for Emergencies) is the
organism made “responsible for ensuring that timely and coordinated scientiﬁc
advice is made available to decision makers”.155
Serious questioning of whether the exceptional measures adopted to deal
with the crisis may entail a dangerous departure from ordinary legality has
been eluded either by framing emergencies in Schmittean terms as exceptional
events falling outside the constitutional order,156 or by simply treating the
leading role of science in the political management of the epidemic as natural
and unproblematic. As a result, the dominant scientiﬁc paradigm and its technological transmission to society is taking more and more the looming semblance
of a pensée unique. Contrariwise, the very fact that a WHO statement can raise to
the foundational event of a global state of emergency with major normative and
political consequences strongly demands an “hermeneutic of suspicion” 157 – i.e.,
the same culture of doubt which should characterize any intellectual analysis. Not
only does the peculiar legal phenomenology of this crisis unsettle settled certainties about the praised tradition of the rule of law: it should also advocate a
more general and far-reaching reconsideration of role of law in society together
with a critical rethinking of the hold of the liberal constitutional model and the
obsolescence of traditional legal taxonomies.

3.2 Law, Science, and Technology in the Prism of Emergency …
and Beyond
The intimate relationship between law and society and the major role of legal
institutions in the maintenance and modeling of social order represent a ﬁle rouge
in Western political and legal thought.
Law has long been conceived as a social institution regulating human actions
and mechanisms. This vision pervades natural law theory’s claims for universal
rights whose validity was said to cross geographic boundaries and even transcend
154 See supra Section 2.1 and 2.2.
155 On the role of SAGE in U.K. response to COVID-19 see https://www.gov.uk/government/
groups/scientiﬁc-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage-coronavirus-covid-19-response.
156 On the idea that emergencies entail an extra-constitutional suspension of legality, see e. g.,
Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in The Constitution in Wartime
Beyond Alarmism and Complacency 39–54 (Id. ed., 2005).
157 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An essay on Interpretation (Denis Savage trans., 1970).
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the very existence of God;158 the origins of modern political thought whereby to the
legal regulation of social antagonism was acknowledged the thaumaturgical virtue
of saving mankind from the savage and chaotic state of nature;159 legal positivism
that, with a polyphony of different voices, exalted the ordering power of law and its
commands160 through its purity161 and disentanglement from the spheres of
morals and politics;162 sociological movements163 and the most recent and sophisticated theories unveiling the interdependence between the legal and the
socio-cultural dimensions.164 Thus, it is almost commonplace to characterize the
Western social context in terms of a law-dependent and even of a law-saturated
society whereby: (i) law is relied upon as an instrument of social change and
organization;165 (ii) the conﬂict between individual rights and community has
been traditionally mediated through the use of litigation;166 and, consequently,
(iii) the legal dimension is conceived as superior to and independent from
politics and traditional beliefs167 with a correspondent progressive “juridiﬁcation” of social spheres which were previously under the realm of other forms of
social control.168

158 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis [1649] (F. W. Kesley trans., 1925) (famously arguing, in the
Prolegomena, for the universal validity of law “even if we were to suppose […] that God does not
exist or is not concerned with human affairs”). See amplius Patrick Riley, The Philosophers’ Philosophy of Law from the Seventeenth Century to Our Days, in A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and
General Jurisprudence, vol. 10, at 11–24 (Enrico Pattaro chief ed., 2009).
159 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651] (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 1996). See also John Locke, Two
Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration 160 (Shapiro ed., 2003) (“men give up
all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative
power into such hands as they think ﬁt, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared
laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the
state of nature”).
160 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined [1832] (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995).
161 See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight trans., 1967).
162 See Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
163 See generally Alan Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law (1978).
164 See Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory
(2006); Id., Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 710
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2nd ed., 2019).
165 See Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954).
166 See Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society (1981); Jerold S. Auerbach, Justice Without
Law: Resolving Disputes without Lawyers (1984). Contra, on how the allegedly litigious character
of Western societies – with speciﬁc reference to the American society and tort law claims – would
be a fabricated myth, see recently, David M. Engel, The Myth of the Litigious Society: Why We Don’t
Sue (2016).
167 See Mattei, supra note 17.
168 See Juridiﬁcation of Social Spheres (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
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According to the foregoing dominant vision, then, at least in principle,
emergencies should represent the perfect test to show commitment to the rule of
law. During emergencies the external signs of sovereign power become more
visible and tangible. The levers of political power shift in the hands of the executive, dissent is curtailed in the name of a superior good (e. g., national security,
public health etc.) and so the hiatus between the democratic legitimacy of political
solutions and their legality tends to get wider. Therefore, as much as law is
generally conceived in a Lockean sense as the elected institutional mechanism to
protect individual rights even at the expense of community, it should all the more
work as the last shield for basic civil liberties against institutional violence in times
of emergency.
And yet, the draconian measures adopted by Western governments in
response to COVID-19 seem to be astoundingly distant from the formal ideals of
liberal democracies.169 In the name of science, those values and liberties which in
the dominant western narrative about law made “liberal constitutionalism […]
synonymous with constitutionalism itself”170 have been suspended and replaced
by liberticide rules and surveillance mechanisms which the same narrative
traditionally attaches to China and to the illiberal despotic East at large. Thus, in
the face of a new critical event of historical proportions like a pandemic, the same
foundations of the rule of law seem to be shaking together with the categories we
inherited from liberal legalism which is now increasingly appearing as a clay-foot
giant.171 Furthermore, from the geopolitical perspective, the same “East” that the
“West”, in its capitalist expansion, has often characterized as legally uncivilized
and, therefore, open to – and in need for – legal colonialism172 is now the model
(conscious or unconscious) in the management of the pandemic with an east-towest inversion of path in the battle for global hegemony whose long-term effects
are still difﬁcult to foresee.
If we manage to observe the pandemic outside of a self-congratulatory
mood triumphally equating the history of the rule of law with the history of the
West,173 what we see is not a mutually beneﬁcial dialectic between science and
169 See Duncan Kennedy, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Liberal Democracies, in Authoritarian
Constitutionalism 161 ff. (Helena Alviar García & Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019).
170 Li-Ann Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Constitutional Law 133, 134 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajò eds., 2012).
171 For a critique of liberal legalism, see Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (ﬁn de siècle)
(1998).
172 For a clever critical reconstruction see Kroncke, supra note 14; Id., Roscoe Pound in China: A
Lost Precedent for the Liabilities of American Legal Exceptionalism, 38 Brook. J. Int’l Law 1 (2012).
173 See e. g., Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010). For a brilliant critical analysis see Bussani,
supra note 10.
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law whereby the latter has a role in presiding over social processes but, rather,
a monologue of science. The law is muted. It plays no role other than to
translate the exceptional measures into norms without an ex ante critical
scrutiny. So, in addition to a change in power relations, this emergency brings
in plain sight also a cultural transformation of legal knowledge which is
progressively losing the remnants of its critical bite. Legal words are progressively losing their original meaning and ﬁre, while the scientiﬁc discourse in its
technological guise has regained such momentum to almost cannibalize other
forms of knowledge.
If one looks through the recent history of legal thought, it is not unprecedented
that the encounter between law and other intellectual enterprises turns into a oneway speech in which extra-legal disciplines adopt a nothing-to-learn attitude. For
instance, it is what happened with Economic Analysis of Law (EAL). Albeit no other
movement has ever enjoyed a comparable degree of success inside and outside
legal academia, EAL has not resulted in a genuine back-and-forth dialog between
the two fields aimed at crossing disciplinary boundaries. On the contrary, it represents a “top-down analysis of the legal world”174 whereby economics imposes its
narrative upon the law and legality is often reduced to efﬁciency with little or no
room for justice.175 On closer inspection, a likewise dynamic is being reproduced in
the current emergency. Science is colonizing legal thinking and disregarding what
law(yers) and politics can do or say about the democratic management of the
pandemic. This is one of the poisonous fruits of the suspension of politics. When
science replaces politics, it gives way to biopolitics which entails a totalitarian
endeavor to subject the entire life of citizens to speciﬁc control producing technological solutions that, in the ofﬁcial narrative, are presented as the only solutions that can reduce the exception to the norm and therefore, with closer reference
to the current pandemic, bring citizens back to their ordinary life.176
The state of exception following COVID-19 crisis has thus revived, in a more
radical and visible fashion, an approach to knowledge which locates scientific
truth at the center of political discourse in a way that closely resembles the
methodological monism and the acritical belief in the neutrality and objectivity of
174 Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics. Essays in Reform and Recollection 7
(2016) (arguing in favor of a methodological difference between the approach known as Economic
Analysis of Law and Law and Economics. The latter – which he rightly claims to be his own
approach – entails a genuine dialog between law and economics whereby each discipline is used
to suggest change and developments in the other).
175 For a critical approach, see Calabresi, supra note 174; Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and
Economics (1998).
176 See Michael Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège De France 1978–79
(Graham Burchell trans., 2008).
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science which were typical of the modern thought.177 In this perspective, it is of
little importance that contemporary epistemology has extensively proved that
scientiﬁc paradigms do not represent objective truths,178 but rather scientists’
agreement on hypotheses that, precisely because of their scientiﬁc character, are
provisional and falsiﬁable.179 The only thing that matters is the conformity of legal
measures with scientiﬁc canons. And since only science is vested with the right of
audience and the authority to speak, those measures should be followed – exactly
as medical instructions – rather than questioned or resisted. Accordingly, it is true
that, for instance, air surveillance or tracking applications are violating the right to
privacy and personal freedom of billions of people. Nevertheless, in the rhetoric of
the emergency, rights violations are downgraded to negligible collateral damages.
As a consequence, in this transformative process, law abdicates its sapiential role
to become a mere bureaucratic tool of enforcement whose function is not to produce solutions to social problems, but to enact the technical knowledge developed
in other intellectual ﬁelds.
What surfaces from the above scenario is, then, a clear decline of law as an
instrument of social organization, and its replacement by other discursive practices (and professionals). Notably, the far-sightedness that Jhering used to locate in
law for its ability to mediate conflicts and serve the social interest180 is now
allegedly referred to the predictive models elaborated by science and technology.
Prediction has suffused and even replaced policing, automated decision-making
processes promise to decrease the margins of error and biases associated with
human judges, smart contracts to reduce transaction costs and enforce the performance of private negotiations without the costly assistance of lawyers,181 algorithms to counter terrorism and crime in a more efﬁcient and effective way.182
Therefore, from this perspective, not only are artiﬁcial intelligence, algorithmic
analysis, machine learning, said to offer technical efﬁcient solutions to the social
problems that were formerly under the domain law but, more generally, to all the
177 See e. g., Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (1979); Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (1991); David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (1990).
178 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolution (1962).
179 See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery (1959).
180 Rudolf von Jhering, Law as a Means to and End 283 (Isaac Husik trans., 1913) (arguing that
“law is the intelligent policy of power; not the short-sighted policy of the moment, and momentary
interest, but the far-sighted policy which looks into the future and weighs the end”).
181 See Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges (Ioannis Lianos, Philipp
Hacker, Stefan Eich & Georgios Dimitropoulos, eds., 2019); The Cambridge Handbook of Smart
Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms (Larry A. Di Matteo, Michel Cannarsa &
Cristina Poncibò eds., 2019).
182 See Andrew G. Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the Future of
Law Enforcement (2017).
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problems of society.183 So, de facto, this narrative turns technology into an allencompassing theory of reality as if it were the only prism through which to look at
and understand human society in the digital age.184
It goes without saying that this paradigm shift is not the product of the
pandemic. COVID-19 has just brought it in plain sight and accelerated an already
ongoing process of marginalization of the legal discourse which is to be read in the
broader context of the recent technological transformations occurring on the
frontiers of global capitalism.
The nexus between law and capitalism is so stringent that all legal modernity
could be reinterpreted as a theoretical framework for capitalist reproduction.185
This relation is perfectly visible in the liberal conception of property which is the
dominant mode of thinking around property in modern Western societies and
reﬂects their atomistic socio-legal structure: a long-lasting powerful narrative in
which individuals do not matter as members of a larger community but as individuals and owners186 and in which property and liberty are made synonyms (the
more you own the more you are free and independent from society)187 so that any
limitation of property becomes a dangerous limitation of liberty.188 In turn, this
narrative has extensively contributed to shape the modern legal and political
imagination in the West and beyond and to create a market society: a social context
in which everything can be commodiﬁed,189 where market values are free to
inﬁltrate every aspect of life, where social relations are reduced to economic
transactions, and where property becomes “the guardian of every other right”190
that must be protected at any cost even disregarding social inequality. As such, the
legal idea of property as the “sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over external things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe”191 developed as an individualistic extractive
183 Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: Technology, Solutionism, and the Urge to
Fix Problems that Don’t Exist (2013).
184 See Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future (2013); Id., Dawn of the New Everything (2017).
185 See John. H. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1934); Ellen Meikesins Wood, The
Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (2002).
186 See Crawford B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to
Locke (1962).
187 See Ellen Meikesins Wood, Liberty and Property. A Social History of Western Political Thought
from the Renaissance to Enlightenment (2012).
188 A clear example of this rhetoric can be found in Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom
(1944).
189 See Margaret Radin, Contested Commodities (1996).
190 James Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right. A Constitutional History of Property Rights
(2008).
191 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. II, 1 (1765).
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mechanism that could not but favor the accumulation of capital in private hands
with a relentless commercial assault on public and common resources at the
expense of nature, community and the have-nots.192 One clear evidence of this
dynamic, is the law supporting the creation of the “Anthropocene”:193 that is the
current geological epoch witnessing an anthropocentric relationship with the
natural world that, instead of fostering an ecological balance, places mankind in a
positional superiority vis-à-vis the environment, justiﬁes the devastating plunder
of natural resources in the name of private proﬁt at the point of causing the death of
original nature194 and its replacing with a fake “second nature” reshaped by human activity.195 Overall, this process has produced a huge change in the balance of
political power with a correspondent progressive shift of sovereignty from the
public sphere (the Westphalian Nation States) to the private one and a transformation of the Smithian concept of the “invisible hand” into the visible ﬁst of
transnational corporations that exercise an almost unrivaled dominion over the
economic and legal sectors.196
The technological and technocratic turn emerging from the pandemic are
nothing but the litmus test of this constantly evolving unbalanced relation between law and global capitalism.
As magisterially highlighted by Rosa Luxemburg, modern capitalism always necessitates to venture in new terrains in search for valuable assets and raw materials.197
And the new Eldorado of this late phase of the capitalist system, which is correctly
termed “surveillance capitalism”198 or “informational capitalism”,199 is the domain of
information and big data. On the one hand, this new economic order is continuous with
the history of market capitalism because, as much as market capitalism, it extracts
resources which are out of the market and commodify them. On the other hand,
however, surveillance capitalism departs from traditional market capitalism, its claims
192 See Capra & Mattei, supra note 119; David Bollier, Silent Theft. The Private Plunder of Our
Common Wealth (2003); Emanuele Ariano, Ius Includendi. Note su Natura e Beni Comuni in America
Latina: Il caso dell’Ecuador, in Beni Comuni 2.0. Contro-Egemonia e Nuove Istituzioni 59–70
(Alessandra Quarta & Michele Spanò eds., 2016).
193 See Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 415(3) Nature 23 (2002).
194 See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology and the Scientiﬁc Revolution
(1980).
195 See David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism 184 ff. (2010).
196 See recently Adam Winkler, We the Corporations. How American Businesses Won Their Civil
Rights (2018).
197 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital [1913] 348 ff. (Agnes Schwarzschild trans.,
2003).
198 See Zuboff, supra note 11.
199 See Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational
Capitalism (2019).
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be more radical and its power more totalitarian. Surveillance capitalism claims all
human experience (behavioral habits, political preferences, sexual orientations etc.)
for the market dynamic, dehumanizes it, takes it as raw material from which to extract
information and, with the help of computational data-processing technology, transforms this inexhaustible source of common resources into privatized predictive models
of what the population will do or think to be sold and purchased on the market.
To say that this new world economic order is the mere product of the commercial imagination and economic greed of big-tech companies like Google, Apple
or Facebook would be simplistic and misleading. It is more convincing to explain
this process in terms of a complex interplay of economic and political forces. In
particular, this new logic is made possible by the connivance between the private
and the public interests occurring at the expense of the community. The former
develops the surveillance technology to predict and influence consumers’ choices
and orientations in all fields of human experience for commercial purposes, as a
new strategy for extraction and accumulation of capital. The latter, especially with
the embrace by political liberalism of global neoliberal economy, endows this
technology with a badge of legal validity and create political consent around it in
the name of a superior good either by coaxing or scaring the polity (be it the war on
terrorism, the war on coronavirus, or another rhetoric grounded in the securitarian
ideology).200 The revolving doors between the public and the private sphere is a
recurrent pattern which ends up favoring the economic interests of strong market
actors, and impoverishing the citizenship and the citizens themselves which
(technological) consumerism is reducing more and more to one-dimensional
men201 as if they mattered only as consumers or netizens (citizens of the web).202
This pattern even surfaces in some of the behavioral changes induced by COVID19. On the one hand both Microsoft and Apple introduced the “Exposure Notification
API” in their software updates to support COVID-19 contact tracing apps developed by
public authorities so that it is downloaded automatically in people’s smartphones with
the alleged goal of helping to “combat the virus and save lives”.203 On the other hand,
governments invited and obliged citizens to “stay at home” and abide by social
distancing rules to save their lives and the lives of their fellow citizens. This narrative
calls upon an ethics of responsibility which justiﬁes the curtailment of rights (notably
200 See the insightful analysis of Ugo Mattei & Alessandra Quarta, The Turning Point. Ecology,
Technology and the Commons (2018).
201 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society (1964).
202 On the origin of the term, see Michael Hauben & Ronda Hauben, Netizens: On the History and
Impact of Usenet and the Internet (1997).
203 See “Google and Apple partner on COVID-19 Exposure Notiﬁcations API” at https://www.
google.com/covid19/exposurenotiﬁcations/.
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the right to privacy) and civil liberties in the name of public health but, on the other
hand, uncritically celebrates the thaumaturgical virtues of technology as a lifesaver
that enables citizens to live their lives and keep on with business as usual (smart
working, smart teaching etc.) with huge proﬁts for technology holders. The less visible
result of this public-private partnership in what is becoming a surveillance society is
that big corporations beneﬁt both from the unprecedented increase in the private use of
technology (e. g., Microsoft reported a 200% increase in meeting minutes204 and so did
Zoom) and from the public stimulus bills passed by national governments.205
The perverted effects of this process are manifest both in the political and in
the legal sectors.
As to the political dimension, these technological transformations concentrate
political power in the hands of big-tech companies which, in the “value polytheism”206 following the death of God and of modern State and the upgrade of humans
into gods capable of a creating a totally artiﬁcial life,207 are thus turned into new
global Leviathans. In turn, this concentration of power in private hands undermines the “human condition”208 by diminishing human agency and the political freedom of citizens who get deprived of their free choice-making capacity
and turned into will-taker commodities whose political and social preferences can
be freely proﬁled, extracted, and even hetero-directed as it sadly emerged from the
Cambridge Analytica scandal.209 As to the legal dimension, almost implicit in
surveillance capitalism is the progressive outsourcing of the public regulatory and
policy functions to non-political actors (e. g., digital platforms) who are thus
bestowed with an almost global inﬂuence over law-making processes. Not only are
these transformations irreversibly modifying the conception of sovereignty, but

204 See https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/blog/2020/04/09/remote-work-trendreport-meetings/.
205 See the economic scenario depicted by Matt Stoller, The Coronavirus Relief Bill Could Turn into
a Corporate Coup if We Aren’t Careful, The Guardian (March 22, 2020); Christopher Mims, Not Even a
Pandemic Can Slow Down the Biggest Tech Giants, The N.Y. Times (May 23, 2020).
206 For the concept of value polytheism, see Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures (David Owen &
Tracy B. Strong eds., 2004).
207 See Nicolas Carr, The Shallows. How the Internet is Changing the Way We Think, Read and
Remember (2010); Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus. A Brief History of Tomorrow (2016). Adam
Greenﬁeld, Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life (2018).
208 The obvious reference is Hanna Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd ed., 1998).
209 See Brittany Kaiser, Targeted: The Cambridge Analytica Whistleblower’s Inside Story of How
Big Data, Trump, and Facebook Broke Democracy and How It Can Happen Again (2019).
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they represent the last step in the construction of a disciplinary society founded on
technological control as foreshadowed by Michal Foucault.210
If legal science does not perform its critical function, it is destined to become a
captive of technology which, instead of integrating the legal discourse, simply disintegrates it by: a) molding legal institutions around the needs and the power
structures of the information age; and b) downgrading legal reasoning to the
normative application of an exogenous, mono-logical way of regulating society.211
From this perspective, the legal process would cease to be a socially determined
activity and would be reduced to one of the apparatuses deployed by biopolitics
and biopower to discipline citizens, surveil them with an invisible eye 212 that
recalls Bentham’s Panopticon,213 and turn citizenry into a passive aggregate of
docile obedient bodies whose free will is annihilated and whose rights can be
violated.214
Signs of this social and intellectual serfdom together with the obliviousness of
the underlying institutional processes are already at play. For instance, even
though what is now conventional wisdom leads us to believe in the neutrality of
algorithms for their asserted ability to cut out human bias, it has been demonstrated that search engines are in fact deeply influenced by race, wealth and
gender so that they end up reproducing or even reinforcing the social and economic hierarchies based on racial discrimination and income inequality existing in
our society.215 Upon closer look, even the very structures of property and contract
have been deconstructed by technology. As to the former, it is worth noticing that
as users of software-enabled devises we do not actually own the smart technology
we purchase, since it is in fact owned and controlled by software companies.216 As
to the latter, the morphology of contract that has been long been based on the
paradigm of consent, is now replaced by de facto relationships governing online
communities and platforms whereby agreements assume the semblances of terms
of use and internauts do not really express consent, since they cannot negotiate or
modify the terms imposed by the Internet provider, with a clear imbalance of

210 Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
211 See Cohen, supra note 199.
212 See David Lyon, Electronic Eye: The rise of Surveillance Society (1994).
213 Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995).
214 See Michael Foucault, Society Must be Defended. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76
(Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., 2003).
215 See e. g., Saﬁya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression. How Search Engines Reinforce
Racism (2018).
216 See Joshua A.T. Fairﬁeld, Owned. Property, Privacy and the New Digital Serfdom (2017).
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powers between the parties and a contractual justice more and more based on the
rule of the stronger.217
In the light of the above, we cannot but conclude that the legal discourse is in
desperate need for a critical, humanist, ecological, non-market-driven218 and
counterhegemonic reorientation: “a global (and local) war of position in which
legal interpretation through praxis (i.e., resistance and disobedience) is systematically carried on by legally and ecologically literate people supported by legal
scholars serving the function of ‘democratic philosophers’”.219 In other words, to
keep law and democracy alive,220 it is unpostponable a critical renaissance in legal
studies aimed at opposing the extractive, imperialistic and proﬁt-oriented mentality rooted in the neoliberal ideology which places selﬁsh proﬁt accumulation
over people, ecology and community.221 It is no coincidence that even COVID-19 as
well as the recent wave of diseases like Ebola, SARS are in a way or another
connected with the human overexploitation of nature and impact on ecosystems.222 Nonetheless, it is possible to take good even out of tragedy. As occurred in
the past,223 a tragic event like a pandemic can be seen as a moment of rebirth to
meditate on some mistakes, or rebel against social inequality. As to the legal
discourse in particular, what is needed is a paradigm shift from competition to
cooperation, from extraction to reproduction, from privatization to access, from
plutocracy to legal and social equality, from exclusion to inclusion, that revisits the
foundations of the legal order and makes it in tune with community and the
environment. The alternative in the long run is to have the law totally downgraded
to an ancillary technique of global capitalism224 or to violent police power, and
lawyers reduced to “the parrots of other men’s thinking”225 acritically mimicking

217 See recently Cohen, supra note 199; and Alessandra Quarta, Mercati Senza Scambi. Le Metamorfosi del Contratto nel Capitalismo della Sorveglianza (2020).
218 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Not for Proﬁt. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (2010).
219 Mattei & Quarta, supra note 200 at x.
220 See James Boyd White, Keep Law Alive (2019).
221 See e. g., Raj Patel, The Value of Nothing. How to Reshape Market Society and Redeﬁne
Democracy (2009); Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy. The Moral Limits of Markets (2012).
222 See the recent WWF reports titled, respectively, “The Loss of Nature and Rise of Pandemics”
(https://d3bzkjkd62gi12.cloudfront.net/downloads/the_loss_of_nature_and_rise_of_pandemics___
protecting_human_and_planetary_health.pdf), and “COVID-19: Urgent Call to Protect People and
Nature” (https://www.wwf.or.jp/activities/data/20200616covid1902.pdf).
223 See Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveler. Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone
Age to the Twenty-First Century (2017).
224 See Katharina Pistor, The Code of Capital. How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (2019).
225 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The American Scholar (1837), in Emerson’s Prose and Poetry 57 (Joel
Porte & Saundra Morris eds., 2001).
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and reproducing technological functioning, eventually to be entirely replaced by
algorithms of prediction.

3.3 Emergency as the New Grand Narrative: A Resistant
Reading
From a purely descriptive perspective, the autocratic turn and the institutional
changes emerging from the pandemic may well be read as further fatal steps in the
lengthily painful process of decline and decay of Western democratic institutions.226 From a wider normative perspective, on the other hand, these are
legal transformations. And, generally speaking, any change in a pre-existing legal
framework is always the visible evidence of the compromise between the established and the new, the ordinary and the extraordinary.227 In other words, through
its prescriptive power, the nomos translates and crystallizes in norms some of the
changeovers occurring in society. The point is to unravel the political hierarchies
and the ideological assumptions hidden in the folds of positively enacted rules by
comparing the different narratives they endorse. Following the teachings of critical
sociology228 as inscribed in some critical comparative studies,229 this stand is the
only safeguard against the risk of being trapped in the hegemonic discourses.
In the light of these premises, in the current times of emergency, one cannot
but observe that the legal outcome of the aforementioned dialectic between
“ordinariness” and “extra-ordinariness” is particularly anomalous. The recent
wave of emergency-based legislation is, indeed, prescribing concrete actions,
practices, and policies that seem to have abruptly diverted legal systems from their
traditional paths, producing unexpected similarities as to the legal arrangements
adopted to master the pandemic in distant legal traditions with a different political
imagery like the Chinese and the Western ones.
Needless to say, it is true that in the current globalized and globalizing era,
whereby no system lives in splendid isolation, culture – and law as a cultural
product – cannot be exclusively deemed as something geographically localized.
226 For an insightful analysis of this process, see Tom Ginsburg & Aziz H. Huq, How to Save a
Constitutional Democracy (2018); Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die: What
History Reveals About Our Future (2018). But see also Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent.
America in Search of a Public Philosophy (1998).
227 See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 217–45 (2000); James Boyd
White, The Edge of Meaning (2001).
228 See Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modern World (1966).
229 See e. g., Mattei, supra note 13; Günter Frankenberg, Comparative Law as Critique (2016).
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The conception of legal order as a “law without borders”230 is the normative
expression of the “liquid times” we are living in.231 Nonetheless, despite the
convergence stimulus of globalization and the recurrent waves of legal imperialism, countries do tend to maintain (part of) their legal identities under different
guises. And primarily, they produce solutions to speciﬁc legal problems that betray
a certain degree of path dependence with their history, language and attitudes
about the role of law in society.232
This is particularly manifested in legal transplants and, in general, in the
migration of legal ideas. In their transfer from the context of production to the
context of reception, foreign legal solutions always undergo some degree of
change ending up being modified in their original nature by the receiving system.233 For instance, notwithstanding the several procedural reforms affecting the
overall structure of the Chinese judicial system that, since the 1980s, clearly
opened the way to in-court more adversarial litigation, the social dimension and
the bequest of Confucian harmony and conciliation culture is still rooted and
overtly manifest in the tendency on the part of the judges to bend formal rules in
order to promote out–of–court dispute settlements.234 This is for legal systems are
the institutional apparatuses which order societies according to a speciﬁc – albeit
mutable – political Weltanschauung that is, in turn, linked to a common cultural
tradition, be it one of its manifold expressions. In this sense, law performs a huge
symbolic function235 in that it mirrors, and renders visible by way of its rules,
rituals and ceremonies,236 the values (e. g., justice, equality, efﬁciency, order,
harmony, etc.) and the power relationships of the cultural settings originating it at

230 See Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, Diritto Sconﬁnato: Inventiva Giuridica e Spazi nel Mondo
Globale (2006).
231 See Zygmut Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty (2007).
232 See e. g., Mattei supra note 6; John Bell, Path Dependence and Legal Development, 87 Tul. L.
Rev. 87 (2013).
233 See Diego López Medina, Teoria Impura del Derecho: La Transformación de la Cultura Juridíca
Latinoamericana (2004).
234 See Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil
Justice Reform in China, in Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China 25
(Margaret Y. K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011); Peter C.H. Chan, Mediation in Contemporary
Chinese Civil Justice: A Proceduralist Diachronic Perspective (2017); Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, “It
Must Be Rock Strong!” Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making in China, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 841
(2017).
235 See Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation 9 (1994) (explaining that: “Originally a symbol
was a token, the present half of a broken table or coin or medal, that performed its social and
semiotic function by recalling the absent half to which it potentially could be reconnected”).
236 See Oscar G. Chase, Law, Culture and Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross–Cultural Context
(2005).
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a given historical moment.237 Thus, legal systems and traditions are constantly
reinvented, but change requires time and sedimentation, and normally passes
through resistance and resilience.238
On this reading, what is truly exceptional and noticeable about the current
crisis is the generalized lack of resistance and the transformative and conforming
power that a temporary natural calamity is exercising upon legal institutions and
political equilibria on a global scale. Accordingly, only by deconstructing the
dominant discursive practises surrounding the current emergency will it be
possible to enhance our understanding of its geopolitical implications in the long
run. And, since the spark of the aforementioned legal transformation, and its
reading key, can be traced to the idea of an emergency-based statutory framework
as devised by and for the claims of this late phase of global capitalism, attention
should be paid to the narrative of emergency.
Emergency is not just a word. It owns the same lure of other grand narratives
(e. g., rule of law, equality, democracy)239 – i.e., all those meta-discourses deployed
to legitimize the imposition of some ideas and practises in the eyes of the choicemakers and depoliticize them in the eyes of the choice-takers. Nihil sub sole novum.
For instance, the rule of law has been extensively used by global ﬁnancial institutions to impose neoliberal policies in the global south to “open its veins”240 and
take advance of its resources, and this neo-colonial effort was disguised under
the legitimizing rhetoric of exporting development and democracy.241 Similarly, the
emergency linked to the “war on terror” launched by the Bush administration had
the effect of perpetuating American imperialism outside national borders and
justifying the gradual erosion of human rights and essential civil liberties endorsed
by the Patriot Act both inside and outside the US.242
By the same token, the coronavirus emergency is no doubt a dreadful epidemic
in need for an effective and systematic response. At the same time, though, history
teaches that, at least in its legally and economically instrumentalized version,

237 See generally Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social
Theory (2006). Mauro Bussani, El Derecho de Occidente. Geopolítica de Las Reglas Globales [2010]
(Elena Sánchez Jordan transl., 2018); Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Geopolitica del Diritto: Genesi,
Governo e Dissoluzione dei Corpi Politici (2013).
238 See The Invention of Tradition (Eric J. Hobsbawn & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
239 On the idea of grand narratives, see Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge [1979] (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi transl., 1984).
240 On this metaphor, see Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the
Pillage of a Continent [1971] (Cedric Belfrage transl., 2009).
241 See Mattei & Nader supra note 10.
242 See Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism
(2006).
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emergency can well work as a technique to open, in the long run, a broad terrain for
unbridled political and economic power. This is part of the spectacle of global law
whereby words are never just words, but, rather the lifeblood of the imperial nomos.
While in colonial times the battles to gain international hegemony were fought with
the open use of military force, the global era has produced more subtle and sophisticated forms of hegemonic domination based on a progressive physical decolonization, by means of the withdrawal of armies from occupied territories, and on
a corresponding narrative re-colonization: an ostensibly bloodless – and thus preferable – imperial expansion carried on through the use of law and economic policies.
The legal discourse perfectly lends itself to this use. Law, in fact, never acts
upon the bare historical reality but, starting from it, selects events and translates
them in accordance to its ordering schemes and language to impose a specific
version of the story.243 In this sense, in Barthesian terms, legal language is
“fascist”, in that it constrains the speech by prescribing what can and cannot be
said about something. It is based on the authority of the speaker and on the
“gregariousness” of its repetition.244 It is not by chance that the ancient Greek term
for legislator is “nomothetes”, that is the ‘name-giver’.245 A legislator is, indeed,
the one who has the recognized authority to establish the meaning of a name by
prescribing the rules for its use.
On a closer look, a similar dynamic is replicated in the global legal response to
the COVID-19 pandemic in which the state of exception was declared by the scientific authority of the WHO – which is thus acting as a global “nomothetes”246
– and the gregarious effect is the echo of this proclamation and its translation in the
set of legal solutions adopted across the globe. It is as if the pandemic had ﬂattened
local legal peculiarities prompting a global legal transplant the long-lasting consequences of which cannot be underestimated.
In this scenario, the terrible coronavirus emergency is being rhetorically
deployed by the political power and by global economic actors to seize on the
momentum. Shielded by the scientific and thus purportedly objective character of
this state of exception, those power structures are building consent around practises that in ordinary times would be labeled as intolerable rights violations.
The perverse effect of this rhetoric is that it creates an aesthetic of terror. It
makes use of the sense of chaos and uprootedness provoked by the pandemic to
fabricate a demand for certainty which makes the population – thus transformed
243 See James Boyd White, Heracle’s Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (1985).
244 See Roland Barthes, Inaugural Lecture, College de France, in A Barthes Reader 461–68 (Susan
Sontag ed., 1982).
245 See Plato, Cratylus 384–89.
246 See supra Section 3.1 and 3.2.
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into a passive patient – desire and even admire the repressive legislation which is
curtailing rights and liberties. This phenomenon is perfectly depicted by Carl
Schmitt when he says that the exception is always presented as “more interesting
than the rule”.247 In accordance with this idea, unsurprisingly the extraordinary
restrictive measures adopted to ﬁght against the pandemic are welcome by the
population for they are presented as belonging to the domain of “necessary”, i.e.,
what cannot be different from what it is.
The foregoing theoretical reconstruction clears up the reasons why emergency
is so functional to discretionary political power. First of all, be it an exceptional
condition, emergency cannot be made to conform to any pre-existing legal
framework. In this sense, the state of exception immediately creates a web of
identity and a web of responsibility. As to the former, identity is linked to the
powerful aggregating and democratic feeling of being “all in the same condition”
– an idea that, behind its sympathetic and democratic façade, endorses legal
uniformity and so a globalization of thought. As to the latter, the mantra in times of
crisis as to the actions to be undertaken revolves around the must to do “whatever
it takes” to solve the problem no matter how much social damage in terms of
temporary violation of rights it might cause – an ethics of responsibility that
justiﬁes almost every practise in the name of a superior good. It follows that all of a
sudden, due to the emergency situation, the system of checks and balances that
gained constitutional recognition through centuries-long revolutions and has
worked as a barrier against the descent of democracy to totalitarianism is downgraded to a bureaucratic futile obstruction to get rid of. To say it with a famous
Cicero’s maxim “silent enim leges inter arma”: in times of war (ordinary) laws are
silent.
The political backlash of such rhetoric is as much obvious as it is perilous.
The war talk about the current pandemic is providing further political support
to the already visible international rise of authoritarian populism.248 In the name of
coronavirus, President Trump has labeled himself as a “wartime President”. And
behind a façade of national security, after declaring national emergency with

247 See Schmitt supra note 5, at 15.
248 See Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian
Populism (2019); Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why our Freedom is in Danger and
How to Save It (2018). For an insightful analysis of the interrelations between authoritarianism and
the pandemic, see Günter Frankenberg, Notes on the Pandemic of Authoritarianism (forthcoming;
an abridged German version of the article can be found in Id., COVID-19 und der juristische Umgang
mit Ungewissheit,Verfassungblog on Constitutional Matters (April 25, 2020), available online at
https://verfassungsblog.de/covid-19-und-der-juristische-umgang-mit-ungewissheit/).
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Proclamation 9994 of March 13, he is instrumentally using emergency to continue
his ruling by decree and his racially-biased anti-immigration policy249 upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii250 by signing an executive order
temporarily suspending immigration to the United States for 60 days (but with the
possibility to extend it “as necessity”).251 The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán, whose plan to build a new authoritarian constitutional order devoid of any
checks and balances is well known,252 invoked his constitutional emergency
powers (art. 53) and had the Hungarian Parliament pass a bill which suspends
general elections and vests him with full and extensive powers to rule almost
indeﬁnitely by decree.253 In Israel, the Prime Minister closed courts and authorized
the national security to draw on data intended for use in counterterrorism activities
to trace the movements of people. And in general, this pandemic is being sometimes used by local governments in open societies to get the Legislative power to
write a blank check to the Executive, as the Italian constitutional disorder has
illustrated. This spread of autocracy is perfectly visible in the impairment of the
civil rights and liberties by the emergency legislation with a clear subversion of the
same liberal constitutional values which have built the dominant image of the
249 See recently Charles R. Lawrence III, Implicit Bias in the Age of Trump, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 2304
(2020).
250 585 U.S. (2018). Justice Sandra Sotomayor wrote a very reﬁned and insightful dissenting
opinion (in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined) unveiling the racist and anti-Muslim bias of
the President’s travel bans («The United States of America is a Nation built upon the promise of
religious liberty. Our Founders honored that core promise by embedding the principle of religious
neutrality in the First Amendment. The Court’s decision today fails to safeguard that fundamental
principle. It leaves undisturbed a policy ﬁrst advertised openly and unequivocally as a “total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” because the policy now masquerades
behind a façade of national-security concerns»; to then conclude that: «The majority holds
otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the
pain and suffering the Proclamation inﬂicts upon countless families and individuals, many of
whom are United States citizens. Because that troubling result runs contrary to the Constitution
and our precedent, I dissent»). See on the point Eric K. Yamamoto & Rachel Oyama, Masquerading
Behind a Façade of National Security, 128 Yale L. J. F. 688 (2019).
251 The text of the order dated 22 April is available online on the website of the White House at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspending-entry-immigrantspresent-risk-u-s-labor-market-economic-recovery-following-covid-19-outbreak/.
252 See Gábor Halmai, The Making of “Illiberal Constitutionalism” With or Without a New Constitution: The Case of Hungary and Poland, in Comparative Constitution Making 302, 304–311 (David
Landau & Hanna Lerner eds., 2019); Maximilina Pichl, Constitution of False Prophecies: The
Illiberal Transformation of Hungary, in Authoritarian Constitutionalism 240 ff. (Helena Alviar
García & Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019).
253 See Kriszta Kovács, Hungary’s Orbánistan: A Complete Arsenal of Emergency Powers, Verfassungblog on Constitutional Matters (April 6, 2020), available online at https://verfassungsblog.
de/hungarys-orbanistan-a-complete-arsenal-of-emergency-powers/.
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West as the quintessential instance of the rule of law and, therefore, superior to,
and incompatible with, the other competing legal cultures, especially the Chinese
one. 254
It is no secret that the traditional Western iconography presents the Chinese
legal experience as a “law without law”,255 a despotic regime with an intrusive
population surveillance for political purposes,256 and therefore a country with a set
of (legal) institutions, values, and concepts whose distance from the Western
paradigm is almost unbridgeable. And yet, the Western response to coronavirus
both in Europe and in the U.S. resembles to some extent the allegedly far “Chinese
model” in terms of restrictions and surveillance mechanisms including data
mining, aerial surveillance, phone tracking,257 facial recognition, and the alike
technological paraphernalia which are being deployed with different levels of
transparency.258
This is not to uncritically praise China’s handling of the pandemic, whose
shortcomings are visible, for instance, in the intrusive use of digital surveillance
technology which, in the name of public well-being, is raising growing concerns
for privacy and rights protection.259 Nor is it a ﬁnal requiem for constitutional
democracies, for this would be too premature a conclusion.260 Rather, on the one
hand this Article is intended to be an opportunity to critically reﬂect, through the
eye of the global pandemic, on the progressive undoing of the Western legal and
political narratives whose backbone has been relentlessly eroded by decades of
neoliberalism and the rise of populism which are making justice a matter of
distilling values down to proﬁt and individual utility. On the other hand, it is an
attempt to acknowledge, beyond value judgments, that from a systemological
254 See e. g., René David & John E.C. Brierley, Major Systems in the World Today 518ff. (3rd ed.,
1985); William J. F. Jenner, The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China’s Crisis (1992). For an
insightful critique of this ethnocentric narrative, see Günter Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional Studies: Between Magic and Deceit (2018).
255 For a brilliant analysis, see Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or is “Chinese Law” an
Oxymoron? 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 655 (2003).
256 See e. g., Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue
Minorities, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2019).
257 In Italy, for instance, Art. 6 Decree-Law 30 April 2020, No. 28 provides for the implementation
of a contact tracing application downloadable on smartphones on a voluntary basis, which alerts
people who come into close contact with persons tested positive with the purported aim to the
virus in order protect their health.
258 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A Flood of Coronavirus Apps
are Tracking Us. Now it’s time to Keep Track of Them, MIT Technology Review (May 7, 2020).
259 See Raymond Zongh, China’s Virus Apps May Outlast the Outbreak, Stirring Privacy Fears, N.Y.
Times (May 26, 2020).
260 For a brilliant analysis on the point, see Ginsburg & Huq, supra note 226.
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point of view the Chinese model, after coping quite successfully with the global
economic recession of 2008, is likely to gain more international prestige for its
national and international handling of the emergency which is being carried out
with the goal of positioning itself as a global leader in pandemic response.
The claimed advantage of China’s solutions could be better explained in the
light of its hierarchical institutional settlement and its self-serving capacity to
mediate between tradition and evolution. In particular, the Chinese legal tradition
could be evocatively compared to the Roman divinity Janus: God of doorways and
transition who was usually depicted with two heads facing in opposite directions.
Similarly, such ‘bifrontism’ between past and future could be found in the Chinese
dialectic between li and fa, between the rule of politics carried out through the rule
of men (ren-zhi) and the gradual establishment of a rule of law (fa-zhi) with Chinese
characteristics which does not conform to the Western legal imagination261 and is
intended to challenge its visions of democracy.262 The pendulum of Chinese law,
then, always swings back and forth. Back to a traditional, Confucian, ethical
collectivist ethos in which law as a form of social constraint cannot be deemed
disentangled from, nor superior to, tradition and politics. This is visible, for
instance, in the traditional principles of yang min (nurturing people), li min
(beneﬁting people) and hou min (enriching people) according to which a good
government is like a patriarch taking care of its children263 – a characteristic that,
in its modern political epiphany, is reﬂected in the wide-ranging quasi-parental
guidance role played by the CCP which, informed by its Marxist–Leninist matrix, is
progressively centralizing the decision-making authority and, especially further to
the constitutional amendments of 2018, has raised to the “deﬁning feature of
socialism with Chinese characteristics”.264 And forth, towards the season of legal
reforms and strategic opening to the outside world (gaige kaifang) started with
Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1970s’ and still continuing, in a different form, under
the leadership of Xi Jinping.265 In particular, as noted by authoritative

261 See Werner Mensky, Comparative Law in a Global Context. The Legal Systems of Asia and
Africa 493 ff. (2nd ed., 2006).
262 See the provocative thesis propounded in Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (2015).
263 See Luigi Moccia, The Idea of ‘Law’ in China, 6 Eur. J. Sin. 9 (2015); Baogang Guo, Sino-Western
Cognitive Differences and Western Liberal Biases in Chinese Political Studies, in Governance Innovation and Policy Change: Recalibrations of Chinese Politics Under Xi Jinping 73, at 82 ff. (Nele
Noesselt ed., 2018).
264 See PRC Const. Art. 1(2).
265 See e.g. Marina Timoteo, China Codiﬁes. The First Book of the Civil Code between Western
Models to Chinese Characteristics, 1 Opinio Juris in Comparatione 23 (2019); Gabriele Crespi
Reghizzi, Evoluzioni del Nuovo Diritto Commerciale Cinese, 213 Il Politico 142 (2006).
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commentators, in the last round of years there has been a growing social legitimacy
attached to law and legal institutions within Chinese society. While this “turn
toward law” is not heading in the direction of liberalism and has been used as a
strategic source of political consensus and economic development, it is nevertheless strengthening the social and political sentiment towards legality whose
role and future developments should be subject to special scrutiny by comparatists.266 From a comparative perspective, this modernization of China paved the
way to the reception of Western legal models which, however, has never coincided
with the pure and simple incorporation of foreign solutions into the Chinese system, but rather worked as a “legal irritant”267: a stimulus prompting changes to
keep the Chinese legal and economic system updated and competitive but, at the
same time, remodeling the imported foreign solutions to adapt them to the local
characteristics and serve the prestige of the Chinese model. This is evident for
instance in the “socialist market economy”,268 and especially in the so-called Belt
and Road Initiative. This new version of the ancient silk road, with the declared
purpose of strengthening infrastructure and investment networks by constructing
economic corridors between China and almost a hundred of other countries, can be
seen as a vehicle to export the Chinese economic and legal model worldwide and
compete for global governance.269
Hence, the real quiddity of the matter, which also motivates the path and
approach followed in this Article, is far beyond traditional legal taxonomies whose
descriptive power has shown its mercurial character and should be critically
revisited in the light of the dynamic competition between legal orders to gain
global hegemony.270 Taxonomies and legal classiﬁcations are never a perfect ﬁt to
the real world. They are, instead, theoretical spectacles through which to look at
legal reality that, though useful, inevitably replicate a certain vision of the legal
(and economic) order and reﬂect the places and times of their origin. Even
comparative law as a discipline, especially through the spread of mainstream

266 See Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 Va. J. Int,’l L. 279 (2019).
267 See Günther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in
New Divergences, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 11 (1998).
268 See Ignazio Castellucci, Rule of Law and Legal Complexity in the People’s Republic of China
119 ff. (2012).
269 See International Governance and the Rule of Law in China under the Belt and Road Initiative
(Yun Zhao ed., 2018); The Belt and Road Initiative. Law, Economics, and Politics (Julien Chaisse &
Jědrzej Górski eds., 2018); China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Changing the Rules of Globalization
(Wenxian Zhang, Ilan Alon & Christoph Lattemann eds., 2018).
270 See e.g., Alessandro Somma, Global Legal History, Legal Systemology, and the Genealogy of
Law, 66 Am. J. Comp. L. 751 (2018). For a general view on the different approaches to legal
classiﬁcations, see Mathias Siems, Comparative Law 84-112 (2nd ed., 2018).

Advantage in Emergency Law

55

functionalism and the uncritical look for commonalities, has been deployed as a
tool to delegitimize those legal experiences deviating from the Western canon
and trying to resist its hegemonic domination.271 To the contrary, comparative
analysis should bring to the fore the ethnocentric structure and hidden assumptions of dominant legal classiﬁcations and acknowledge that “the end of
history, allegedly marked by the post-Cold War triumph of both liberalism and
global capitalism, will have to be postponed again”.272 Here it lies the deep and
too often unpursued “subversive”273 potential of a truly critical comparative
approach.274 Any sympathetic reading of social processes merely taking side
with the winners thereof would lead to a formalistic in vitro legal analysis substantially reproducing existing hierarchies and power structures without adding
much to the scholarly debate.
Neither could the “legal” sense of the current emergency be found in the “here
and now” dimension. Rather, it lies in the political genealogy of the operating set of
policies enacted to master this epidemiolocal crisis and their long-term effects on
our existing practises, for the norm may well end up being “destroyed by the
exception” if the exception is normalized.275
The questions should thus be: what happens in the aftermath of the crisis?
What about the dark side of this state of exception paving the way for an
increasingly intrusive surveillance and technology-driven model of society?
While, indeed, emergency justly commands immediate actions and immediacy
may obliterate nuances, past experiences teach that the looming effect of its
rhetoric is its magical capacity of turning short-term measures into long-lasting
restrictions on rights and freedoms.
From the ashes of the norm a new order may emerge, and this transformative
process is what has to be put under critical scrutiny. Accordingly, a purely sympathetic reading of the current emergency situation motivated solely by the
presence of “exceptional conditions” would be pointless and harmful. An unreserved apology of the present would just make us replicant lawyers at the service of
the dominant narrative. Contrariwise, what we think is essential to interpret this
course of history is a resistant reading. At the heart of resistance lies critique, and

271 See Mattei, supra note 23.
272 Günter Frankenberg, Preface, in Authoritarian Constitutionalism x (Helena Alviar García &
Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019).
273 See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 683
(1998); Horatia Muir Watt, La Fonction Subversive du Droit Comparé, 52 Revue Internationale de
Droit Comparé 503 (2000).
274 See Mattei, supra note 12; Frankenberg, Comparative Law as Critique (2016).
275 See Schmitt supra note 5, at 12.
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“critique is always restlessly self-clarifying in search of freedom, enlightenment,
more agency, and certainly not their opposite”.276

4 Conclusive Remarks: New Hegemonies and the
Rule of Technology
The previous materials seem to confirm the hypothesis of legal systems reacting in
distress by deploying their most readily available solutions and the development
of a new authoritarian pattern of law based on scientific and technological hegemony. China, a legal system mostly based on the bureaucratic structure of a
Leninist Communist Party, has reacted through the ordinary process of vertical
coherence, typical of socialist legality.277 Local actors have been smoothly
substituted, and the Leader has taken direct charge of the process, structuring an
ordered model of emergency rule of law. This idea is only a slight variation on the
vision of the “rule of law with Chinese characteristics”, what some Western observers have named rule by law through which China after 1978 initiated its highly
successful phase of capital accumulation.278 In China, mighty technological
companies such as Tencents and Baidu display a tremendous power of surveillance, which today works as a device of social control and prediction rivaling
professional law in its effectiveness. Not only in China, but also in countries within
its collectivistic cultural ethos, like Korea and Singapore, such techniques have
been used without concern for individual privacy issues. Israel followed suit (and
Italy is attempting to do so) showing how this approach is capable of global reach
within core rule of professional law countries.
Italy in distress has also deployed some of the typical characters of its
neoliberal transformations occurring after 1989. In particular semi peripheral
countries, just like the global South before, have been encouraged to concentrate
power in the executives, abandoning parliamentary systems and proportional
representation to join in the winner takes all logic of Washington consensus. To be
sure, such move has been promoted with efficiency narratives of “reform”. Critics
have been quick to observe how power concentration in executives much facilitates foreign invasions of internal economic policies, through conditionality

276 Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism 73 (2004).
277 See Mattei, supra note 23.
278 See Ignazio Castellucci, Rule of Law and Legal Complexity in the People’s Republic of China
(2012).
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corruption, or blackmail, by such technocratic organisms as the so-called Troika
(IMF, ECB, EC), or the NATO in defense policy.279
In Italy, such process of power concentration often contested by the
people has been accomplished by political parties in power mostly through
the abuse of existing Constitutional law. Indeed, the attempt to change the
Constitution to concentrate power in the executive failed in 2016, defeated by
popular referendum, but nevertheless Governments kept abusing emergency
decrees (Art. 77 Constitution) and the confidence vote to blackmail Parliament
of dissolution. In distress, such a trajectory has been further amplified with
the Prime Minister abusing his own personal organizational power, invading
functions reserved to the Cabinet as a collective body.
The personal activism of a Chief of the Executive without personal executive power, thus incomparably weaker than his French or Chinese counterpart, has produced a similar relaxed attitude by Regional Governors in the
north (belonging to opposition parties) towards the limits of their own executive authority, thus conflicting with the central power in a pernicious de
facto competition at the expenses of citizen’s rights. The central Government
simply cannot dare removing locally elected ofﬁcials (as Xi successfully did in
China) just like President Trump simply cannot dare removing rebellious
Democrat Governors in New York or California. Consequently, distress in
capitalist multi-party countries simply disrupted the chain of command
showing the crisis of constitutional liberalism and of its multiparty conception
of democracy and the failure of the rule of law in the hands of partisan or
excessively weak systems of Constitutional adjudication.
This scenario shows in emergency an advantage of legitimate single-party
political systems (Cuba indeed dealt with excellent professionalism and cosmopolitan attitude to the crisis) mostly because unimpaired by spectacular political
conflicts aimed at attracting voters in the next electoral round. Sure, the West can
point at single-party political systems as “dictatorships”. However, not only is this
not a serious critique in front of the complex model of leadership selection in a
modern Communist party such as the CPC, but in emergency there is no moral
stand anymore of constitutional liberalism engaging in comparably authoritarian,
while unruly, secretive practices accompanied by hypocritical individual rights
discourses such as privacy.
To be sure, if the state of exception has been declared by the WHO (and the
struggle among superpowers, private and public, for its control is in the news almost
every day), such “scientific” global sovereign as a matter of course seeks capital279 For how such strategy has worked in the Global South already in Cold-War era see, John
Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (2004).
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intensive technological solutions as the outcome of the crisis. Correspondently,
technology is increasingly gaining status as the novel “theory of everything” and
every corner of human existence is likely to become monitored and ranked.280
Tremendous economic forces emerge to push humankind further on the Internet
frontier where, for the ﬁrst time in global distress, yet a new system of social control
rules. A “take it or leave it” logic, experienced on the platform, that can now be seen
as a fourth “pattern of law” that simply did not yet exist 30 years ago.281
The development of such “fourth” technological pattern of law allows critical
comparative theory to predict a change in global hegemony. Unimpaired by narratives of privacy and individualized freedom, China has received from California
(the previous U.S. hegemon), expanded and much more smoothly incorporated in
its legal system, the logic of surveillance capitalism. The Chinese legal system,
through the CPC, proves to be actually in control of its giant technological companies, something that is far from true in the West with giants such as Facebook,
Google or Amazon that do control the law rather than being controlled by law.
The United States reached global legal hegemony by the aftermath of WWII,
first by overcoming economically and later digesting and exaggerating the European components of the legal system (role of the judges from England, charter of
rights from France, powerful legal science from Germany).282 Similarly, we can
predict that the Chinese advantage in emergency law and the development of a
new global pattern of law, the rule of technology, might point to the emergence of an
unexpected Chinese legal leadership, determined by the ﬁnal collapse of liberal
constitutionalism provoked by COVID-19.

280 See Daithí Mac Síthigh & Mathias Siems, The Chinese Social Credit System: A Model for Other
Countries?, 82 Mod. L. Rev. 1034 (2019).
281 See Mattei, supra note 17.
282 See Mattei, supra note 13.

